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Abstract 
The ability of a military to respond to environmental changes rather than rigidly adhere to 
previously defined concepts of operation is paramount to overcoming unforeseen 
battlefield technological challenges. A force with the greater capacity for learning and 
adaptation will possess significant advantages in overcoming unforeseen challenges. 
However, it is unclear as to what determines the flexibility or adaptive capacity of a 
military during military engagements. To address this issue, this study focuses on intra-
war adaptation as a product of a military’s strategic culture in overcoming enemy 
technological surprises. The work demonstrates the symbiotic relationship between 
strategic culture and adaptability that ultimately determines how effectively a force will 
respond to unforeseen battlefield challenges. For this reason, strategic culture is 
indispensable in explaining why militaries may continue to act in ways that are 
incongruous with prevailing operational circumstances while others are adept at 
responding to Clausewitzian fog and friction. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction           
 
 
There is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of 
success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order 
of things. For the reformer has enemies in all those who profit by the 
old order, and only lukewarm defenders in all those who would 
profit by the new order.1 
 
Niccolò Machiavelli 
 
Introduction  
On June 24, 1942, U.S. Navy chief anti-submarine warfare expert Captain Wilder D. 
Baker informed Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet Admiral Ernest King that 
the Battle of the Atlantic was being lost.2 Admiral King was being informed of the dire 
situation regarding the Battle or War for the Atlantic, the longest continuous military 
campaign of WWII, at the height of the German attempt to cut off Britain from the 
supplies needed to wage war. The campaign reached its height in 1942, when German U-
Boats under the command of Karl Doenitz began an assault on coastal shipping in the 
immediate vicinity of the United States. During the 1942 and the early months of 1943, 
the Allies suffered the greatest average monthly tonnage loss of the entire war.3 While the 
German onslaught ultimately failed to sever Britain’s lifeline to the U.S., it surprised 
Allied forces in posing a risk to planned offensive operations in Europe.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince and The Discourses, (Random House, Inc., 1950): Chapter VI, 
21. 
2 Cohen, Eliot, and John Gooch. Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War. New 
York, NY: Free Press, 1990: 62.  
3 Padfield, Peter. Dönitz: The Last Führer. Cassell & Company, 2001: 240.  
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In World War I, the Allied introduction of the convoy and other antisubmarine 
measures kept their depredations at the hand of German submarines limited. This is 
because Allied patrols forced U-boats to dive, becoming far slower submerged than 
convoys. Yet most navies had few ideas of how to combat submarines beyond locating 
them with sonar and then employing dropping depth charges against them. During the 
interwar period the Germans crafted an improved operational concept for their U-Boats 
by forming “wolf packs” of half a dozen submarines. When WWII began, sonar proved 
much less effective than expected against German wolf packs, and was of little use 
against U-boat nighttime surface tactics. Despite having access from the beginning of the 
war to British information about anti-submarine warfare (ASW), the U.S. Navy was 
surprised by their mounting losses and ineffectiveness of WWI convoy concepts.  
The Navy had initially defined the War of the Atlantic as the acquisition of 
technical information rather than the assimilation of new forms of information, 
compounding the inadequacy of the organization of naval forces for wartime 
requirements. American efforts fell on technical matters in the form of the performance 
of sonar, new types of depth charges, and attack trainers. Similarly, the Navy’s definition 
of readiness was largely technical, focusing on numbers and quality of ships, munitions, 
planes, and supplies.4 “By the end of 1942 it had become clear that improvement in the 
quantity and quality of antisubmarine equipment and personal could not by itself win the 
battle of the Atlantic.”5 A centralized planning and operational authority was needed. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Cohen and Gooch, Military Misfortunes, 88.  
5 National Defense Research Committee. A Survey of Subsurface Warfare in World War II. 
Summary Technical Report of Division 6, Vol 1. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1946: 92. 
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While American naval forces demonstrated a clear failure not only to anticipate 
German operational changes, the Navy recognized the need to adjust ASW to intra-war 
developments. This American adaptation can be attributed to the cultural dispositions of 
the U.S. Navy at the time: a resistance to mirroring the British ASW organization, 
operational concepts favoring offensive action, and a predisposition for technological 
solutions. The result, a successful adaptation to German surprise and the challenges of 
ASW, represented by the creation of the American Tenth Fleet in May of 1943. The fleet 
was responsible for ASW training and the direction of operations at sea. It sought to 
combine operational intelligence, control of convoys, allocation of antisubmarine units, 
and direction of establishments charged with the development of ASW technology.6 The 
organization allowed for the creation of a uniform tactical doctrine, and enabled greater 
cooperation in ASW doctrine. This top-down organizational adaptation facilitated tactical 
flexibility, producing a second order effect of tactical adaptation and feedback.  
In the six months after the creation of the Tenth Fleet, American naval forces sank 
75 U-Boats, a significant improvement from the 36 U-Boats sunk in the 18 months prior 
to its creation.7 Revised American hunter-killer tactics using escort carriers on search and 
destroy patrols proved complementary to the British use of escort carriers to directly 
defend convoys, suppressing the effectiveness of and destroying U-boats. The ability to 
adapt to changing battlefield circumstances often serves as the defining factor in 
battlefield outcomes. As Cohen and Gooch advocate in their work on battlefield failures, 
“The ability to adapt is probably most useful to any military organization and most 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Cohen and Gooch, Military Misfortunes, 91.  
7 Ibid.  
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characteristic of successful ones, for with it, it is possible to overcome both learning and 
predictive failures.”8 
 
Background  
In the complex operational environment of war, the ability to rapidly adapt can determine 
success or failure. Military victories almost certainly require forces to adapt to the 
operational environment and challenges they face, both when they first deploy and as 
campaigns evolve. A military establishment that is too slow to recognize and respond to 
battlefield surprises or adjust its assumptions to reality faces an increased likelihood of 
defeat. Effective military organizations adapt their prewar assumptions and concepts to 
reality, rather than attempt to impose prewar conceptions on the war they are fighting. A 
determining factor in battlefield orientation is not whether failures in battle are the result 
of the inability to perform tasks that have been well defined and that continue to be 
accepted as legitimate by the organization, since the solutions are matters of established 
organizational routine. The key is the ability and manner in which militaries react when 
wartime problems fall outside the parameters of established missions and concept of 
operations (CONOPS). Thus war disciplines militaries by forcing them to refine and 
sometimes revise their tactics, techniques, and technologies, or risk defeat. However, 
militaries are often the victims of change rather than the agents of change. 
Traditional theories of military learning outlines top-down reform or innovation 
such that leaders of the state perceive threats to state security and direct military 
institutions to act in ways that address the threat and protect the state. When threats are 
perceived to be undergoing change, leaders direct military institutions to take steps to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Ibid, 94.  
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address new threats. The summation of these steps produces military change. However, 
this type of approach is applicable primarily in cases of peacetime, when information is 
more readily available and there is little Clausewitzian friction or fog. Most scholars 
concentrate on explaining these major forms of change as peacetime innovations, which 
impact military strategy and doctrine. Such research does not include smaller-scale 
changes such as adaptation in operational means and methods, or battlefield technology 
and tactics. While these changes may have limited implications for organizational 
strategy or structure, they are most likely to occur during wartime and influence the 
outcome of battles and wars.  
Yet there is no theory of how militaries improve during war. To try and address 
this, scholars have developed theories for intra-war learning in the form of battlefield 
flexibility and have studied the degree of effectiveness in the flow of timely information 
and intelligence up and down chains of command. By applying these concepts to battle, 
one can begin to think of war as a competition of learning through adaptations. The 
ability to learn and respond to environmental changes rather than rigidly adhering to 
previously defined CONOPS is paramount to overcoming unforeseen battlefield 
challenges. Militaries can prepare for unforeseeable enemy actions by integrating an 
absorptive capacity into their force planning in order to be able to adapt to any enemy 
surprises. Therefore the force with the greater capacity for adaptation will possess 
significant advantages in the outcome of the conflict. However, it is unclear as to what 
determines the absorptive or adaptive capacity of a fighting force in response to 
unexpected challenges.  
 
   7	  
Definition of Terms  
In addressing intra-war changes, Stephen Rosen advises, “there are so many examples of 
military organizations that have been unable, for whatever reasons, to learn from wartime 
experience that we are forced to be cautious in assuming that innovation during wartime 
is a straightforward matter of observing what works and what does not work in combat.”9 
Common theories of organizational learning based on the study of organizations that do 
not face the fog of war may not be useful in studying learning and adaptation during 
war.10 Hypercompetitive environments call for organizational strategies and structures 
that place a premium on learning, innovation, and cooperation.11 Therefore it is prudent 
to develop a definition of organizational learning and adaptation based on strategic 
culture as it applies to intensive battlefield “under fire” adjustments, which are meant to 
counter the enemy’s interwar or wartime innovations. There is also a need to differentiate 
between common terms for military learning both during war and in peacetime, such as 
innovation, reform, and adaptation.  
The most useful definition for wartime adaptation can be derived from Theo 
Farrell’s study of British military adaptation in Afghanistan’s Helmand Province from 
2006-2009.12 Farrell defines adaptation as a change in tactics, techniques or existing 
technologies to improve operational performance. In other words, adaptation is the ability 
to think anew and capitalize on changed circumstances through the fusion of 
resourcefulness and judgment. Farrell argues that military organizations can adapt in two 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Rosen, Winning the Next War, 7.  
10 Finkel, On Flexibility, 23.  
11 Staber, Udo, and Jörg Sydown. “Organizational Adaptive Capacity: A Structural Perspective.” 
Journal of Management Inquiry 11, no. 4 (December 2002): 409. 
12 Farrell, Theo, “Improving in War: Military Adaptation and the British in Helmand, 2006-
2009,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 33:4, (July 2010). 
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ways in responding to battlefield changes or technological surprise. First, forces can 
exploit core competencies in refining or modifying existing tactics, techniques, or 
technologies.13 Second, they can explore new capacities by developing new modes and 
means of operations.14 This is distinct from doctrinal adaptation, which occurs within the 
larger context of strategic transformation. Therefore, some adaptations involve science 
and technology, while others are in the realm of concepts and organizational design. In 
both cases, however, the ability to adapt rests on the ability to discern current and 
emerging trends, as well as to anticipate their impact.  
Change, learning, and adaptation, have all been used to refer to the process by 
which organizations adjust to their environment. Another term, flexibility, rarely appears 
in military literature except as a synonym for related concepts like adaptability.15 This 
study interprets flexibility as synonymous with adaptation at the tactical level in allowing 
field commanders to make decisions and operate based on initiative. Tactical command 
and control can improve adaptation by helping tactical commanders react quickly as the 
battle unfolds and capitalize on tactical-level opportunities. 
For the purposes of this study, adaptation is not synonymous with innovation. 
Barry Posen’s 1984 The Sources of Military Doctrine provides a foundation for the 
development of a growing body of literature that focuses on military innovation.16 Much 
of this literature has examined how strategic, political, and technological developments 
have produced strategic or political conditions that served as sources of change in 
military organizations, while more recent contributions to this literature have examined 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Ibid, 4.  
14 Ibid.  
15 Finkel, On Flexibility: 6.  
16 Posen, Barry, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the 
World Wars, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984). 
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how social conditions, or norms of identity and behavior, can structure military change.17 
Following Posen’s work, Stephen Rosen’s Winning the Next War studies major military 
innovations, which he defines as a change in the way one of the primary combat arms of 
a service fights. Major innovations change a military’s CONOPS, as opposed to tactical 
innovations that change how specific weapons are applied to targets.18 While adaptation 
results in operational and tactical changes, based on individual problem solving 
initiatives, the strategic level of warfare can be attributed to military innovation and 
doctrinal reform, both higher order concepts.  
Tactical adaptation and organizational innovation are mutually supportive. 
According to James Russell, tactical adaptation occurs when units change organizational 
procedures on the battlefield in order to address perceived organizational shortfalls 
generally revealed by interactions with the adversary.19 Organizational innovation seeks 
to capture the process by which tactical adaptations gather organizational momentum and 
validation, leading to the creation of new standard operating procedures (SOPs) 
embodying organizational capacities that did not exist when the units began their 
deployment.20 This occurs when an action results in procedural and physical adjustments 
that help an organization better match its inputs and outputs with its desired goals and 
objectives.21 However, the collective momentum of tactical adaptations can be 
characterized as organizational adaptation. Since tactical adaptations can produce new 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Ibid, Chapter 2.  
18 Rosen, Winning the Next War, 7.  
19 Russell, James A. Innovation, Transformation, and War: Counterinsurgency Operations in 
Anbar and Ninewa, Iraq, 2005-2007. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Security Studies, 2011: 192. 
20 Ibid.  
21 Serena, A Revolution in Military Adaptation, 10-11.  
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organizational structures and capacities during wartime that change the nature of 
organizational outputs. 
Janine Davidson discusses this concept of organizational learning in the context 
of the American military in military operations other than war.22 In analyzing the record 
of U.S. military involvement in and adaptation to stability and reconstruction operations, 
she seeks to identify how operational experience is or is not translated into organizational 
learning. Davidson’s institutional adaptation is distinct from the adaptation that this study 
focuses on in that she analyzes a response to the overall combat environment through 
strategic and doctrinal reform towards a counterinsurgency strategy. Most important, the 
adaptations in this study occur as a series of bottom-up procedures developed over the 
course of engagements with enemy forces.	  
 
Literature Review 
Technological Surprise  
Military technology is a force multiplier or means of overcoming strategic and tactical 
handicaps and inequalities. Weaker powers employ military technologies in the form of 
new or existing technology, tactics, strategy, or their combination to “level the playing 
field.” According to military historian Max Boot, while technology sets the parameters of 
the possible and creates the potential for military change, the extent to which forces 
recognize and exploit opportunities inherent in new tools of war is what produces actual 
innovation.23 In other words, merely possessing a technology does not allow for a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Davidson, Lifting the Fog of Peace. 
23 Max Boot in Adamsky, Dima, The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural 
Factors on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the US, and Israel, (Stanford, Calif: 
Stanford Security Studies, 2010): 1. 
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narrowing of the capabilities gap between warring factions. Thus a key concept that has 
historically proven vital for weaker powers in gaining parity in battle is the deployment 
of a weapon system in an unanticipated fashion or unfamiliar to the stronger power. This 
alludes to the concept of technological surprise.  
Throughout history, nations have found themselves confronted with unexpected 
threats that place them at a fatal military disadvantage. These situations are an extension 
of the more general military notion of surprise. Michael Handel first illustrated the 
concept of technological surprise in a 1987 article in Intelligence and National Security.24 
He defines technological surprise as the unilateral advantage gained by the introduction 
of a new weapon or by the innovative use of an existing weapon in war against an 
adversary who is either unaware of its existence or not ready with effective counter-
measures, which the development of which requires time.25 It is essential that the 
technology be employed with an effective doctrine in order to maximize tactical and 
strategic effects to produce technological surprise.  
Tactical surprises have tactical consequences, necessitating a response on the part 
of combat commanders. Operational surprise threatens operational vulnerabilities and 
requires a response beyond the resources of the tactical commander. Operational 
responses can include a redistribution of forces within the theater, the release and 
employment of theater reserves, and other decisions within the remit of the operational 
commander.26 They may also necessitate reaching back into strategic resources and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Handel, Michael. “Technological Surprise in War.” Intelligence and National Security 2, no. 1 
(January 1987): 1–51. 
25Ibid, 5. 
26 Smith, Andrew. Improvised Explosive Devices in Iraq, 2003-09: A Case of Operational 
Surprise and Institutional Response. Letort Paper. U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA: 
Strategic Studies Institute, April 2011. 
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capabilities. In the latter situations, surprise begins to impinge on the strategic level, 
requiring a strategic response. A successful strategic surprise facilitates the destruction of 
a sizeable portion of the enemy’s forces at a much lower cost to the attacker by throwing 
the inherently stronger defense psychologically off balance and temporarily reducing its 
resistance.27  
There are few studies on technological and doctrinal surprise. According to 
Handel, “while strategic surprise has been studied extensively as a strategic and 
intelligence problem, technological surprise has received only scant attention in the open 
literature.”28 The lack of intensive study may be explained by three primary concepts. 
First, strategic surprise is of greater interest due to existential ramifications of strategic 
defeat. Second, isolating the uniqueness and influence of a technological or doctrinal 
surprise often proves elusive when analyzing a combat environment. Third, for security 
reasons military establishments are reluctant to discuss their reactions to such surprise.29 
While much of Handel’s application of the concept focuses on the World Wars, 
he illustrates a notion that continues to grow in importance given the increasingly 
technological nature of warfare. As the capabilities of the world’s strongest militaries 
continue to grow with the development of advanced systems and platforms, weaker 
powers struggle to prevent the power gap from widening, as they may not have the 
financial, intellectual, or organizational capacity to develop and employ similarly 
sophisticated technologies. Under such conditions, each side attempts to leverage its 
strengths against its opponent’s weaknesses. Surprise is the ultimate asymmetric threat 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Handel, “Technological Surprise in War,” 5. 
28 Ibid, 3. 
29 Finkel, Meir, On flexibility: recovery from technological and doctrinal surprise on the 
battlefield, (Stanford, California: Stanford Security Studies, 2011): 7.  
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because it interferes with the stronger power’s ability to assess adversary capabilities and 
intentions, as well as account for one’s own vulnerabilities. It exploits natural proclivities 
and inherent and systemic vulnerabilities by capitalizing on complacency and 
misperceptions. Surprise, whether intentional or unintentional, can also influence policies 
and public opinion at home and abroad through the force-multiplying effects of shock, 
thus potentially shifting the balance of power by shaping perceptions in the adversaries’ 
favor. 
According to Israeli Defense Force (IDF) Brigadier General Itai Brun, the 
strategic evolution of groups or states at the weaker end of a balance of power continues 
to occur as a counter-strategy to superior conventional militaries.30 Brun writes that 
technologically inferior powers have been seeking to improve their absorption capacity, 
the ability to increase survivability against advanced conventional arsenals, in order to 
create effective deterrence, shift the war to more convenient areas in case the deterrent 
fails, and avoid engaging in a war of attrition.31 For example, all current U.S. adversaries 
fall far behind the United States in maneuver and firepower capabilities. These 
adversaries will likely avoid confronting the U.S. military in direct battle, instead relying 
on innovative means to counter U.S. material superiority without directly opposing it, 
while seeking to exploit perceived weaknesses through surprise. The result is that the 
boundaries between the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war become less 
clearly defined. Conversely, nations with modern conventional militaries like the United 
States lack the natural incentive to employ surprise, often dismissing the concept as a 
weapon of the weak. However, defeating these threats requires a thorough understanding 	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of the nature of surprise, as well as the resolve to minimize its impact and consequences 
through adaptation. Consequently, Handel’s concept of technological surprise is perhaps 
more relevant now than towards the end of the cold war due the proliferation of precision 
weapons, globalization, and the rise of groups or states seeking to challenge traditional 
balances of power.  
As the pursuit of surprise by a group is common when facing a notably stronger 
force, the outcome of a conflict will be determined by the response of the superior power 
to the actions of the weaker power. Even devastating technological surprise will not bring 
about decisive long-term results unless such results immediately follow. As the impact of 
surprise fades, a variety of technological and doctrinal countermeasures as well as other 
variables are introduced that affect the outcome of war.32 Therefore time is one of the 
most important dimensions of technological surprise, as the more time required by the 
opponent to react and develop a counter reaction, the greater the impact of the 
technological surprise. 
The study of battlefield adjustments begins with the great military theorist Carl 
von Clausewitz. Based on Clausewitz’s theories, battlefield adaptations are necessary 
given the fog of war and the fact that the best laid battle plans fall victim to the first 
moments of war. When wartime surprises occur, adaptation is key, especially if enemy 
surprises occur outside the parameters of established CONOPS. Adaptation is most 
effective when associated with a redefinition of the measures of strategic effectiveness 
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employed by the military organization, and has generally been limited by the difficulties 
connected with wartime learning and organizational change due to time constraints.33 
In addressing this concept and building off the work of Handel, IDF Colonel Meir 
Finkel studies the response of surprised powers in determining the outcome of a conflict. 
Finkel’s work On Flexibility: Recovery from Technological and Doctrinal Surprise on 
the Battlefield is unique in its study of military responsiveness to wartime shocks.34 
According to Finkel, the solution to technological and doctrinal surprise lies not in 
predicting the nature of the future battlefield or obtaining information about the enemy’s 
preparations for the coming war, but in the ability to recuperate swiftly from the initial 
surprise.  
While organizational and tactical flexibility are often discussed in military 
research, the concept has not been analyzed in detail nor has a comprehensive theoretical 
framework of flexibility been proposed.35 To address this, Finkel’s work is structured 
around his proposed theory of flexibility, which he defines as: 
The combination of doctrinal, cognitive, command, organizational, and 
technological elements, that if properly applied can eliminate most 
obstacles in the current paradigm that stem from biases caused by 
problems inherent in large organizations such as failure to learn from 
mistakes and ideological rigidity.36 
  
He shows that when armies improve their response skills and reaction time to 
technological and doctrinal surprise, most obstacles based on prediction and intelligence 
solutions become superfluous. Michael Doubler demonstrates the utility of flexibility in 
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his work on WWII, Closing with the Enemy.37 Through out the study Doubler addresses 
organic sources of tactical flexibility and adaptation. In one case, he argues that the 
breakout from the Bocage in Normandy resulted from a series of small changes stemming 
from the adaptation of existing technology to break through the hedgerows.38 This was 
supported by the tactical placement of weapons and personnel to disrupt German 
defenses. 
Finkel concludes his study with a brief mention of military culture, hypothesizing 
that military culture appears to be of importance in establishing an infrastructure for the 
culture of flexibility that is required for the recovery from surprise. He alludes to the 
critical connection between strategic culture and tactical responsiveness in battlefield 
settings, when military change tends to come more from the spontaneous interactions 
between soldiers, technology, and tactical circumstances. The critical ability in 
establishing a feedback loop between strategy and tactical analysis is whether an 
organization is capable of making intra-war changes and adopting them widely.  
Theories of Military Change	  
Scholars of military change draw on three overlapping theories to explain the sources that 
can either facilitate or impede successful adaptation: bureaucratic politics, organizational 
theory, and organizational culture.39 
Bureaucratic politics theory describes how military leaders, like leaders of other 
large organizations, seek to promote change from within their respective organization. 
Theorists of this school identify the conflict between influential individuals and 	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bureaucracies as the drivers of military innovation and seek to identify which 
relationships initiate and shape innovation more so than the others. In his work Winning 
the Next War Stephen Rosen proposes an internally driven model in which “mavericks,” 
or officers who advocate change from within conservative military organizations, 
produce these changes.40 These insiders must challenge existing methods for waging war, 
refine a new method, and manage the political struggle that accompanies the change. 
Similarly, Rosen argues that peacetime innovation involves a top-down campaign of 
military change led by a visionary military leader.  
In their study of military failures, Cohen and Gooch argue that scholars should 
avoid the pitfalls of the “dogma of responsibility” by realizing that the concern is not 
awarding demerits or prizes to defeated or successful commanders but to discover why 
events unfolded the way they did.41 Therefore, instead of testing men and institutions, we 
must examine the structures though which they work and explore how those structures 
stand up to the stresses they encounter. This suggests the second theory of military 
change: organization theory.  
Organization theory views military organizations as highly resistant to change. 
For organizational theorists, militaries resist change as a result of structural systems, 
norms, and standard operating procedures that together focus behavior toward particular 
outcomes. Accordingly, the theory predicts that all militaries should fail to adapt, without 
exception. There are three main approaches to organizational theory: the rational systems 
approach, the open systems approach, and the natural systems approach.42 According to 	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Isaacson et al., the rational systems approach outlines organizations as rational actors that 
pursue their goals efficiently. The open systems approach sees organizations as having a 
limited ability to act rationally because they are embedded in, and constituted by, the 
environment in which they operate. Lastly, the natural systems approach sees 
organizations as having a limited ability to act rationally because of cognitive constraints, 
and as dedicated to pursuing their narrow self-interest. Thus they can only operate within 
a bounded rationality.43 In this study I employ the natural system model of organization 
theory because it is not only the dominant organizational theory paradigm, but also the 
best-suited approach for the analysis of military operations.  
The aim of a bureaucracy is imposing order and form on a world that is disorderly 
and ambiguous. Without a coherent design for promoting adaptation, an organization 
might find it impossible to learn and apply lessons to effectively accomplish mission 
objectives. Murray points out the irony; a bureaucratic system is absolute necessity for 
successful adaptation, but the rhythms of most bureaucracies are antithetical to successful 
adaptation. They are more about efficiency than effectiveness, and become prisoners of 
prewar assumptions and perceptions.44 Michael Horowitz studies this notion of limited 
organizational capital in the context of his adoption capacity theory, identifying 
organizational characteristics such as resources for experimentation, ossified 
bureaucracies, and critical task definitions as possible limiting factors to successful 
adaptation or innovation.45   
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Similarly, Chad Serena points out in his study of the U.S. Army in Iraq from 
2004-2006 that defensive routines employed by large organizations hide errors made by 
the organization and complicate the adaptive process. Methods for employing strict 
organizational control also serve to limit the opportunities for adaptation. The embedded 
and often inflexible standard operating procedures common to many organizations reduce 
the prospects of realizing considerable organizational gains through change.46  
The third theory of adaptation identifies a unique culture that perpetuates the 
routines that reinforce institutional norms and CONOPS. This theory suggests that all 
large organizations have assumptions, beliefs and values that underpin their views and 
actions. According to Farrell and Terriff, cultural norms are inter-subjective beliefs about 
the social and natural world that define actors, their situations, and the possibility of 
action. These norms produce persistent patterns of behavior by becoming 
institutionalized within an organization.47 In addressing adaptation, unexpected 
circumstances test organization and system by revealing not only weaknesses that are 
partly structural and partly functional, but also cultural predilections regarding the range 
of possible solutions. For this reason, culture is useful in explaining why militaries may 
continue to act in ways that are incongruous with prevailing strategic and operational 
circumstances, or implement effective battlefield reforms.  
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In recent years, the concept of culture has become increasingly relevant to the 
study of military organizations as well as organizations in general.48 A notable proponent 
of this school is Elizabeth Kier. Kier rejects the conflict-relationship thesis of 
bureaucratic politics and argues that culture better explains military innovation. 
According to Kier, culture directly shapes the thinking of military leaders and therefore 
can enable or inhibit certain innovations. She cites the example of mechanized warfare in 
the interwar period as a prime example, showing that cultural factors drove different 
outcomes in Britain, France, and Germany, despite a shared experience in WWI with 
similar technology.49  
A narrow demonstration of distinct military cultures in action is demonstrated in 
the early Cold War years. The West German army’s view of warfare as a creative activity 
contrasted sharply with the American’s more managerial approach so much so that a 
group of German officers criticized American army manuals for what they saw as a 
dangerous tendency to try and foresee all possible scenarios. Another example involves 
the nascent Israeli army, which avoided the British emphasis on parade ground drills, and 
instead stressed combat skills and the paratrooper spirit by requiring all officers to 
undergo jump training.50 Cultures differ, and it is these differences that account for 
doctrinal, operational, and even tactical preferences. 
In the causal chain of military effectiveness, the independent variables of service 
cultures, civil-military relations, politics, and social structure coalesce to form the 
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concept of a broad national military culture.51 Upon further study, the cultural perspective 
involves two levels of analysis: the strategic culture and organizational culture 
approaches. The former emphasizes the use of force by a state, while the latter 
emphasizes the use of force by a specific service branch. Strategic culture posits that 
states have distinctive, consistent, and persistent views on how they think about the use of 
force. As an amalgam of values, traditions, and their philosophical underpinnings that 
shape the context for military behavior, strategic culture is the principal input in the cycle 
of military change. In other words, strategic culture is the frame of reference through 
which ideas, attitudes, traditions, and preference for military action are considered. As 
such, it has an identifiable effect on how units respond to changes in the operational 
environment. To identify and measure the impact of a state’s strategic culture on the use 
of force, it is necessary to analyze both current and historic episodes and texts in order to 
identify not only strategic preferences but also concepts that relate to the nature of 
military operations in the form of SOPs and CONOPs.  
Most studies on military change involve an integrated approach to the 
aforementioned theories, since each approach can help explain the dynamics of a 
particular case and provide some general lessons for the student and practitioner alike. In 
their totality, they show that innovation comes about through a series of complex 
interactions at levels both internal and external to an organization, and that a variety of 
factors or conditions can either promote or hinder the process. This study attempts to 
identify how militaries seek to win wars by overcoming unforeseen challenges. While the 
use of the cultural approach is limited in explaining major peacetime innovations and 	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reforms to force structures, this study will demonstrate that it is most useful in 
conditioning military responses to unforeseen challenges in war.  
The realist school of political science derives a fourth noteworthy theory of 
military change. Structural realism posits that the international political system is 
fundamentally anarchic. Hence, the international political system is a self-help system in 
which states must ensure their own security either by external balancing through alliances 
or internal balancing involving the enhancement of their own military forces. 
Accordingly, structural realist indicators may reveal incentives to innovate. States that 
face serious external threats, have revisionist ambitions, or face relative resource 
constraints all have powerful reasons to innovate militarily, making them more likely to 
do so. First, fear is a powerful incentive for a state to innovate. States that believe they 
are highly insecure have a strong incentive to innovate, while those that believe they are 
secure have little incentive. Second, states with revisionist political aims have strong 
incentives to innovate because they are willing to use force to alter the geopolitical status 
quo. Third, states with expanding international interests and ambitions, like rising 
powers, innovate because their outward projection of growing power increases their risk 
of conflict, and their interests must be defended. Finally, insecure states that lack allies 
and consequently must rely exclusively on internal balancing for security have strong 
incentives to innovate.52  
There are two points of contention with the realist explanation for intra-war 
change. First, realist theory is predicated on states perceiving threats to their own 
security. Yet given the inherent bolt from the blue nature of technological surprise, states 
may not foresee threats to their security until after the unexpected enemy action. As a 	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result there is a limited opportunity for innovation prior to enemy engagement. Second, 
the phenomenon of technological surprise produces an obvious incentive for intra-war 
adaptation. Realism would predict that all states that encounter technological surprise 
would seek to innovate. Similar to organizational theory, realism predicts the same 
outcome across all cases. However, observed variation across cases demonstrate that the 
realism explanation is lacking. Thus realism is better suited for an analysis of inter-war 
innovations.  
Strategic culture theory is best able to explain the largely bottom-up change by 
forces at war as opposed to bureaucratic politics and organizational theory. The concepts 
of flexibility, slack, and absorptiveness are part of a culture that understands the need for 
tactical experimentation and perhaps a new operational framework after suffering a 
technological surprise. This, in turn, requires a strategic culture that encourages initiative 
and does not punish the failures that innovation invariably brings about. These qualities 
often rest on the fundamental attributes of societies that in turn reflect in their militaries. 
As this study will demonstrate, strategic culture influences wartime military activities and 
ultimately military effectiveness. 
Strategic Culture Literature  
Strategic culture is the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns 
of habitual behavior that members of a national strategic community have acquired 
through instruction or imitation and share with each other. It reflects its own functional 
imperative and the social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant within its larger 
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society.53 Strategic culture encompasses the purpose and possibility of military change by 
producing persistent patterns of behavior that are institutionalized within an organization.  
Strategic culture is distinct from military culture, which itself can be broken into 
the culture of each service branch. Military culture has been studied because it possesses 
a tight knit social architecture that strategic culture does not, and is easier to quantify and 
measure due to the smaller number of variables involved. However, understanding why 
militaries behave differently under the stresses of combat requires an analysis of the 
organization’s culture and how their basic assumptions, values, beliefs, norms, and 
formal knowledge shape the collective understandings of their members. This approach 
encapsulates both the cognitive or mental thought-ways that result from shared values, 
traditions, experience, as well as behavioral trends in employing military force.54 In other 
words, a nation’s “way of war” is an expression of how the nation’s military wants to 
fight wars.  
The notion that there is a connection between a society and its style of warfare has 
a long and distinguished pedigree. One of the earliest examples is of the Peloponnesian 
War, as Thucydides records that Spartan and Athenian leaders linked the capabilities of 
their militaries to the constitutions of their respective states.55 Success in waging wars 
that run counter to national ways of war may come only after a period of painful 
adaptation.  
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Jack Snyder first identified the notion of strategic culture in the late 1970s in the 
context of analyzing Soviet nuclear strategy during the height of the Cold War. Snyder 
presumed the distinctive stylistic predispositions and behavioral patterns of Soviet 
strategists during security crises reflected Soviet strategic culture. The unique Soviet style 
of strategy, he argued, would best be understood by evaluating both the sociological and 
intellectual elements of Soviet strategic thought though the Soviet organizational, 
historical, and political context.56  
In his in-depth study of pre-modern Chinese strategic, Alastair Johnston comes to 
a conclusion utilizing rigorous procedures to test for the existence and influence of 
strategic culture. According to his analysis, different states have different sets of strategic 
preferences that are rooted in the early or formative military experiences of the state, and 
are influenced by the philosophical, political, cultural, and cognitive characteristics of the 
state and state elites.57 According to Johnson, much of the work on strategic culture is 
deterministic because it asks, “Here is a set of strategic assumptions; where do they come 
from?”58 According to Johnson, a researcher following this approach moves back in time 
to a point where she or he finds similar assumptions. This guarantees that the researcher 
will find continuity, which is then labeled as strategic culture. The alternative method, 
which this study utilizes, is to ask, “Here are some past, historical strategic assumptions; 
where do they go?”59 While strategic culture is not quantifiable, this approach allows a 
researcher to empirically discern preferences for how military forces may be employed. 	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These qualitative preferences are observable throughout the spectrum of military force, 
from doctrine down to the tactical level. Together, these observable components of 
military-strategic culture tend to demonstrate a preferred paradigm for war.  
There is a debate among scholars as to how strategic culture affects behavior. A 
notable feature of this debate is that researchers do not disagree about the importance of 
strategic culture, but rather disagree about the precision of the explanation for a specific 
behavior and how it is measured. The dispute occurs between those who perceive 
strategic culture both as a constituent of that behavior and as a context for the behavior 
itself, and those who argue for more positivistic thoroughness and attempt to filter the 
effects of culture more precisely.60  
As opposed to the notion that culture causes end-guided action providing 
preferred ends that cause organizations to change their behavior, this study adopts the 
view that culture provides a generally accepted way of accomplishing tasks, not as 
defining end goals. This outlook was first advanced by Ann Swidler, who argued that a 
culture has enduring effects on those who hold it, not by shaping the ends they pursue but 
by providing the characteristic repertoire from which they build lines of action. In other 
words, every culture contains “tool kits” for of organizational behavior.61 Swidler 
invokes culture to explain continuities in action in the face of structural changes, or why 
different groups behave differently in the same structural situation. She concludes that 
culture limits the range of strategies of action. As such, the effects of culture are seen 
through strategies of action not by defining ends of action but rather by providing 	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constructs of action.62 In other words, strategic culture directly influences the inputs in 
the adaption cycle, rather than prescribing a preferred output. With the knowledge of a 
military’s strategic culture, one can better predict its adaptive capacity and operational 
effectiveness in responding to technological surprises. 
Strategic Culture in Action  
One of the most notable works that evaluates the relationship between military strategic 
culture and technological change is Dima Adamsky’s study of the U.S., Israeli, and 
Soviet military’s reactions and the subsequent changes to their force structure and 
doctrine based on the late 20th century revolution in military affairs (RMA).63 Adamsky 
comes to the conclusion that strategic and military culture explains the different ways in 
which military innovations, based on similar technologies, develop in different states.64 
Unlike Finkel, Adamsky looks at strategic level innovations. He identifies the socially 
constructed relationship between technology and innovation as a result of national 
military tradition and professional cultures that interact with the technology. From his 
work it is clear that there is a symbiotic relationship between technology, strategic 
culture, and the development of new theory of victory. Combining his strategic analysis 
with Finkel’s study of the tactical responses of powers facing battlefield technological 
surprise can provide a unique insight the operational management of war and the 
responsiveness of militaries to surprise.  
A seminal piece on the relationship between military culture and adaptation 
comes from Williamson Murray’s article “Does Strategic Culture Really Matter?” and his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Ibid, 273-289.  
63 Adamsky, Dima, The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the 
Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the US, and Israel, (Stanford, Calif: Stanford Security 
Studies, 2010).  
64 Ibid, 8. 
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book Military Adaptation in War.65 According to Murray, there is a consistent historical 
pattern of military organizations’ imposing their prewar concepts of future combat on the 
actual conditions of war, instead of adapting to the conditions despite the fact that the 
need for adaptation has increased with advances in technology. Military and strategic 
cultures that remain enmeshed in the day-to-day tasks of administration, and believe that 
the enemy will possess no “surprise” responses are military organizations headed for 
defeat.66 On the other hand, strategic cultures with adaptive capacity do not experience 
environments passively. In the process of interpreting and acting on environments, they 
reconstruct them in ways that change the conditions to which they then adapt.67 	  
From James Russell’s study of the counterinsurgency strategy adopted by the U.S. 
in Iraq around 2007, we can discern the enabling cultural factors for successful 
adaptation.68 Similarly, Fiol and Lyes identify the contextual factors that affect the 
probability that organizational change will occur.69 The first is the empowerment of 
tactical-level leadership. Instrumental to successful adaptations are flexible and 
decentralized organizations that are characterized by flat and informal hierarchical 
structures. Organizational leadership must establish a culture of learning and intellectual 
flexibility by granting lower-level initiative to junior officers.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Murray, Williamson, “Does Military Culture Matter?” Orbis, Foreign Policy Research Institute 
43, no. 1, The End of American Military Culture, (Winter 1999): 27–42, and Murray, Military 
Adaptation in War, 2011. 
66 Murray, “Does Military Culture Matter?” 38.  
67 March, James. “Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning.” Organizational 
Science, Organizational Learning, 2, no. 1 (February 1991): 85.  
68 Russell, James A. Innovation, Transformation, and War: Counterinsurgency Operations in 
Anbar and Ninewa, Iraq, 2005-2007. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Security Studies, 2011. 
69 Fiol, C. Marlene, and Marjorie Lyles. “Organizational Learning.” The Academy of Management 
Review 10, no. 4 (October 1985): 803–813. 
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The second factor is information flow. While military bureaucracies can have 
peacetime reputations as stove-piped organizations reluctant to share information, 
successful change requires flow of information up and down chain of command as well 
as horizontally from unit to unit. Therefore, adaptive capacity is understood in terms of 
double-loop learning, which enables questioning and changing the prevailing goals and 
tactics, as well as developing new doctrines and information flows.70 Strategic cultures 
that resist adaptation often follow a pattern of single-loop learning, which assumes that 
goals are relatively stable and focuses more on the means by which existing goals are 
pursued.71 These contextual factors for organizational adaptation can be thought of as an 
absorptive capacity that facilitates adaptive processes. Accordingly, the strategic culture 
most conducive to battlefield adaptations views adaptation not as an optimal end state but 
as a dynamic process of continuous learning and adjustment that permits discussion, 
ambiguity, and complexity.  
 
Research Design  
This exploratory study is designed as the first step towards establishing a causal link 
between strategic culture and wartime military adaptations with the hypothesis that the 
determining factor of the aforementioned concept of tactical and operational adaptation is 
strategic culture. This culture, formed during peacetime, will determine how a force 
reacts to wartime occurrences more so than theories regarding bureaucratic politics and 
organizational theory. While strategic culture provides a limited range of choices or 
tendencies for the use of force, militaries with an adaptive capacity do not experience 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Staber, Udo, and Jörg Sydown. “Organizational Adaptive Capacity: A Structural Perspective.” 
Journal of Management Inquiry 11, no. 4 (December 2002): 412. 
71 Ibid, 415.  
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environments passively. In the process of interpreting and acting on environments, they 
reconstruct themselves in ways that change the conditions to which they then adapt. 	  
This study focuses on intra-war adaptation as a product of a military’s strategic 
culture by analyzing tactical and operational responses to unforeseen technological 
challenges posed by an enemy force. The relationship between strategic culture, 
adaptability, and battlefield encounters is a symbiotic one. This relationship must exist 
between top-down and bottom-up thought, so that even if the military’s structure and 
operational culture becomes ill suited to the challenges on the battlefield, it will be able to 
adapt and harness its own intellectual capital to further progress. This internal capacity 
must be able to transcend traditional doctrinal frameworks and must be deeply embedded 
in its institutional culture. 
This relationship will be demonstrated through an analysis of the strategic culture 
and battlefield performances of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) in the Sinai Theater of the 
1973 Yom Kippur War, the Soviet Army in Afghanistan circa the 1980s, and finally the 
U.S. military’s experience over the past decade in Iraq. In each case, the superior force 
largely set itself up for failure by projecting its conception of the order of battle onto the 
enemy. This is indicative of possibly a larger trend of power disparity and its effect on 
battlefield preparations.  
Each case study will open with a discussion of the independent variable strategic 
culture, followed by a brief background on the conflict in which the nation was engaged 
as well as how strategic culture was manifested in initial battlefield operations. Within 
the context of discussing the battlefield setting, I will discuss the technological system 
employed by opposing forces that achieved an effect of technological surprise as an 
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intervening variable. Emerging tactical surprises can operate at both the strategic and 
operational levels as well, and are particularly dangerous as they test the adaptability of 
military forces and the strategic culture of their respective defense establishments.  
The three empirical cases were selected for several reasons. First, in each case, the 
intervening variable of technological surprise is similar across the three cases. The nature 
of each enemy system is negative in that it was designed to deny the superior power the 
freedom of mobility required to maximize its conventional effectiveness. In addition, the 
enemy systems surveyed in this study all possess a tactical and strategic duality that 
would define the conflict by forcing the studied power to adapt or risk defeat. Therefore, 
technological surprise definitely brings about the need for adaptation by clearly 
manifesting any issues in force preparation and dispelling erroneous preconceived 
notions.  
The deployment of the “surprising” system serves as an evident starting point 
from which to isolate and measure the response of the superior power. Subsequently, it is 
the wartime interaction between technological surprise and strategic culture that produces 
a unique adaptation. Therefore, while there are many cases of intra-war adaptations from 
the tactical to the strategic level, identifying conflicts involving technological surprise 
with the appropriate time frame is difficult. For example, the war in Southern Lebanon 
involving Israel and Hezbollah in 2006 was not included in this study, despite the 
achievement by Hezbollah of technological surprise; Hezbollah countered IDF armor 
through the use of Russian-made anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs). According to 
Israeli officials, 52 Merkava main battle tank were damaged during the engagement, 45 
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of them by different kinds of ATGMs.72 However, during the 34-day conflict, ground 
engagements occurred during a single period of about two weeks, a time period too short 
to allow for significant adaptive processes to be developed, implemented, and measured. 
The effectiveness of the enemy technological system must be measured from its first 
deployments to the end of the conflict. A decrease in effectiveness denotes a successful 
adaptation. In addition, changes in force structure, tactics, and operating procedures that 
can be related to the technological system indicate adaptation.  
Second, the cases demonstrate the enduring role of strategic culture over three 
disparate militaries; the highly centralized, conscript, and politically deferential Soviet 
military; the small yet agile, citizen-soldier, practitioner IDF; and the techno-centric, 
decentralized, and volunteer force of the American military. While these militaries may 
share elements of strategic cultures, the key is the aggregation of these factors in 
producing a unique way of war. In addition, the cultures of the respective militaries have 
been widely studied from historical and social perspectives to after action reviews, and 
are therefore highly qualifiable.  
Third, the three conflicts surveyed in this study largely cover the spectrum of 
military operations. The 1973 Yom Kippur War falls on the conventional inter-state 
conflict end of the spectrum, with the irregular counterinsurgency campaign of the Iraq 
War falling on the opposite end. In between these two extremes are the Soviet war in 
Afghanistan and the 2006 Lebanon War, both conflicts that combined many irregular and 
conventional components. Different types of conflict, such as irregular versus 
conventional, attribute different roles to different echelons of command. For example, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Rapaport, Amir. The IDF and the Lessons of the Second Lebanon War. Mideast Security and 
Policy Studies. Bar-Ilan University, Israel: Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, December 
2010: 13.  
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irregular engagements place greater emphasis on combat commanders as opposed to 
brigade and battalion level officers. By covering the spectrum of operations, the study 
will demonstrate the universal role of strategic culture across any type of armed 
engagement.  
Finally, the variation of the dependent variable and the adaptability of the military 
will be analyzed through the lens of bureaucratic politics, organizational structure, 
strategic culture, and realist theory in determining which theory was most influential in 
explaining the conflict outcome. This research will conclude with a set of policy 
prescriptions for militaries in preparing for future engagements in which enemy forces 
are likely to seek technological surprise to alter the balance of power on the battlefield.   
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Chapter 2 
The IDF, Sagger, and the Sinai       
 
It is not the strongest or the most intelligent who will survive but those 
who can best manage change.  
 
  Charles Darwin 
 
A complex weapon makes the strong stronger, while a simple weapon—so 
long as there is no answer to it — gives claws to the weak.1  
 
  George Orwell 
 
Introduction  
This chapter analyzes the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and their performance in the 1973 
Yom Kippur War, fought against the Egyptian and Syrian Armed Forces. While military 
operations were fought in both Northern and Southern Israel, this chapter focuses on 
Egyptian and Israeli operations in the IDF Southern Command theater of operations. 
Specific attention is paid to the misconceptions produced by Israeli strategic culture, 
Egyptian achievement of technological surprise, and finally the IDF response that was 
able to turn the tide of the war in favor of the Israelis. The following description of the 
Battle of the Sinai and subsequent analysis demonstrate the primacy of strategic culture 
and bureaucratic politics in explaining the Israeli actions, while refuting the opposite 
predictions of realism and organizational theory.  
 
Israeli Strategic Culture  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 George Orwell, “You and the Atomic Bomb,” First published in the Tribune, London, GB, 
October 19, 1945. 
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Since gaining independence in 1948, Israel has been involved in numerous conflicts 
along the spectrum of military operations ranging from low intensity border skirmishes 
and terrorist attacks to large-scale conventional operations in which the survival of the 
nation itself was at stake. Despite deficiencies in manpower and equipment, Israeli forces 
have relied on tactical brilliance and ingenuity to achieve battlefield success. Israeli 
victories during the numerous conflicts of the 20th century elevated the IDF to near 
mythical status in the eyes of neighboring countries. 
Israel’s lack of geographic depth, small but educated population, and 
technological skill have produced a strategic culture that emphasizes strategic 
preemption, offensive operations, initiative, and qualitative technological superiority. In a 
Cold War setting these characteristics, combined with a fear that the major powers would 
use diplomatic pressure or the threat of military intervention to stop a war before Israel 
could achieve its war aims, reinforced an Israeli predisposition for short-war strategies.2 
Furthermore, lacking a massive military-industrial base, Israel had limited stocks of 
munitions and supplies; a short-war strategy would limit having to rely on outside state 
support for resupply and possibly risk forfeiting its strategic or operational freedom of 
action. Finally, short wars reduced the possibility that a conflict would escalate to involve 
the targeting of civilian population centers. 
Geographically and numerically at a disadvantage, Israel has continuously 
focused on the defense of its existence and freedom by developing a defensive strategy 
with a reactive offense directed at undoing or negating the objectives of its opponents. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Cohen, Eliot, Michael Eisenstadt, and Andrew Bacevich. “Knives, Tanks, and Missiles”: 
Israel’s Security Revolution. Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 
1998: 17.  
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Israel has also sought to maintain its deterrent posture by projecting an image of 
invincibility. It has therefore put a premium on daring covert operations and commando 
raids far from its borders, and, in war, the swift and complete destruction of enemy 
forces. Over time these policies have become central to the self-perception of the Israeli 
public. Israel continues to rely on deterrence, backed by a rapid mobilization capability, 
and is prepared to act preemptively should deterrence seem to be eroding. 
Israel could not, according to the framers of its doctrine, afford to adopt a purely 
defensive approach because it could not trade space for time. Israeli military planners 
decided that war must take place in enemy territory, and that Israeli ground forces must 
carry it there, thereby creating a kind of artificial strategic depth.3 Therefore, while IDF 
doctrine at the strategic level is defensive, its tactics are offensive in nature. Israel has 
sought to shift combat operations into enemy territory to achieve a quick victory and 
spare the Israeli home front. These concepts continue to define Israeli strategic culture 
today, with the goal of maintaining a qualitative edge over enemies in order to offset its 
numerical inferiority and ensure its deterrent posture.4  
The IDF operates a decentralized command structure in order to facilitate 
offensive initiative and maneuver warfare as a means of dealing with Israel’s operational 
challenges. IDF organizational structure also reflects in part the demands of a conscript-
based, reserve-oriented military system. Because of Israel’s size, the relative simplicity of 
its military chain of command, and sense of national unity, solutions for overcoming 
problems can flow remarkably quickly to the top of command. In addition, the tradition 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Ibid, 16.  
4 Giles, Gregory. Continuity and Change in Israel’s Strategic Culture. Comparative Strategic 
Cultures Curriculum. Advanced Systems and Concepts Office: Defense Threat Reduction 
Agency, June 18, 2002. 
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of leadership from the front brings senior military commanders to the point of decision, 
thereby cutting through the layers of bureaucracy that might otherwise stifle new ideas. 
Most militaries evolve such organizational shortcuts in wartime, to be sure, but few have 
made them standing operating procedure to the extent the Israelis have.5 
As such, the IDF has historically demonstrated a proclivity for tactical adaptation 
to operational challenges. It is indeed the popular image of Israeli military innovation that 
accounts for much of the respect with which foreign commentators view it. Israeli 
military culture is presumed by most observers to reflect levels of military proficiency 
and adaptability similar to that of Germany during the wars of unification and WWII; 
small unit commanders achieving victory through the core elements of strategic culture 
such as tenacity, initiative, and the maintenance of objectives. 6 Further, constant 
operational activity served to reinforce pragmatism, flexibility, and a penchant for 
simplicity that are hallmarks of the IDF, while minimizing many of the routines of 
garrison life and peacetime training that affect other armies. 
The result is an Israeli reliance on the quality of its soldiers as much if not more 
than on technical inventions to secure victory. The IDF has traditionally believed that its 
successes rest on the skill and spirit of its soldiers who, in its large wars in 1948 and 
1967, fought for the survival of the state. Because the goal of the Arabs in most of their 
wars with Israel was the eradication of Israel as a nation, the Israelis always felt as 
though they were fighting not simply to win, but also to exist. This fight for existence has 
served as a unifying factor in both the public and military, adding to the camaraderie and 
bond associated with military service. Israeli officers traditionally lead from the front 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Cohen et al. “Knives, Tanks, and Missiles,” 65.  
6 Ibid, 49.  
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rather than from a rear headquarters area, and are unwilling to send troops into a fight 
that they would not go into themselves. This reliance on leaders’ and soldiers’ bravery 
reflects what Clausewitz called Volksgeist or a patriotic national spirit.7 
While the concept of Volksgeist is familiar to many nations as a means towards 
building an effective fighting force, the Israeli conception functions as an end in 
preparing soldiers for war. Thus, despite an impressive learning curve within the techno-
tactical ream as demonstrated in the nation’s first wars, the IDF did not possess a 
formalized system for learning lessons from campaigns or after action reviews until the 
early 2000s.8 The growing dichotomy between the IDF’s tactical adeptness and strategic 
inadequacies became apparent during the decades following Israeli independence: 
The IDF’s battlefield success blinded it from seeing and achieving a 
strategic view and modeling the IDF as an operational arm of its political 
masters. Israel’s conflicts in the next thirty years would nullify its 
unwritten pre-emptive doctrine focused on armored and airpower 
excellence. These following years would expose the extent to which Israel 
truly could not understand what it was really seeing.9 
 
As a result, the tactical expertise of IDF officers never translated to intellectual 
inclination to make qualitative leaps in military thought. At a deeper level, Israeli officers 
are suspicious of “big ideas” in the art of war. Acutely sensitive to Clausewitz’s friction 
and fog, they have traditionally mistrusted grand theories or publishing doctrine in 
written form. In a military constantly at war, advancement comes not through educational 
achievements, eloquence, or intellectual reputation but through demonstrated success as a 
field commander. This overwhelming preference for the practical doer over the theorist 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Bolia, Robert. “Overreliance on Technology in Warfare: The Yom Kippur War as a Case 
Study.” Parameters, U.S. Army War College 43, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 54.  
8 Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation, 122. 
9 Billmyer, Maj.  John. The IDF: Tactical Success - Strategic Failure, SOD, the Second Intifada 
and Beyond. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: School of Advanced Military Studies, United States 
Army Command and General Staff College, April 13, 2011: 34. 
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reflects the founding labor Zionist ideology of the early part of the century.10 This also 
stems from the formative years of the IDF after the victory in the war for independence in 
1949, when the military had no agencies dedicated to institutionalizing learning or the 
study of military theory. Instead of theoreticians, academics, and research institutions, the 
IDF has officers familiar with military theory and flexibility regarding new battlefield 
concepts.11  
1967 War and the Lead-up to 1973 
Any discussion of Israeli strategic culture in affecting the battlefield outcomes of the 
Yom Kippur War of 1973 must be considered in the historical context of Israel’s victory 
in Six Day War of 1967 against the same foes. This is because the IDF’s conduct in 1973 
was largely based upon its success in 1967. The success of advanced weaponry combined 
with more easily defensible borders and the still-fresh memory of the swift victory in 
1967 stimulated feelings of increased confidence in Israel’s deterrent posture. Israeli 
military leaders had felt that they had found the perfect mix of weapons and tactics to 
defeat any enemy. In addition, by 1973 the country could boast the production of the Kfir 
attack plane, mobile medium artillery and long-range guns, the Shafrir air-to-air missile, 
and sophisticated electronic devices.12 These military accomplishments ushered the IDF 
into the age of electronic warfare and served to enhance Israeli society’s undaunted 
confidence in the deterrent capabilities of its military. Most importantly, utilizing a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Cohen, et al., “Knives, Tanks, and Missiles”, 74.  
11 Shamir, Eitan. Transforming Command: The Pursuit of Mission Command in the U.S., British, 
and Israeli Armies. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Security Studies, 2011: 82.  
12 Gawrych, Dr. George. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory. 
Leavenworth Papers. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command 
and General Staff College, 1996: 5.  
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combination of highly mobile armor and total air superiority, the IDF held itself to be 
nearly invulnerable: 
The 1967 Arab-Israeli War transformed tiny Israel into a regional 
superpower: a puny but potent David had handily defeated a Goliath. The 
IDF had every reason to bask in its resounding military victory, both for 
the magnitude of that success and for the social and economic benefits that 
accrued from the war. There now appeared little hope for the defeated 
Arabs militarily, for with the passage of time, Israel seemed destined to 
become even more powerful than her Arab neighbors. Nonetheless, six 
years later, in 1973, Egypt and Syria initiated another war against Israel, 
knowing full well that they were incapable of decisively defeating the 
Israelis. Caught off guard, the IDF failed to duplicate its impressive 
performance of 1967. The consequent political fallout in Israel after this 
failure can only be understood in light of the Six Day War.13 
 
The IDF quickly came to rely on domination of the air to cover its mobilization 
and to make possible the offensive thrusts that its operational style requires. Thus, a 
powerful air force designed first to neutralize enemy air and air defense forces and then 
to interdict and destroy enemy forces on the ground, became an essential feature of the 
Israeli military. In the Six Day War, Israeli pilots flying mainly French-made aircraft 
destroyed 304 Egyptian planes on the tarmac and then inflicted similar damage on the 
smaller Jordanian and Syrian air forces.14 This astonishing feat depended upon excellent 
intelligence, detailed planning, and superior training. Control of the air allowed the Israeli 
ground forces to roll through the Arab armies with relative ease and dramatic speed. 
Ultimately, the 1967 war confirmed the critical importance of gaining air superiority in 
maneuver warfare. Consequently, Israeli war strategies depended upon Israel maintaining 
an air force superior in quality and comparable in quantity to the Arab air forces. 
The Armor Corps constituted Israel’s other pillar of strength. Because enemy 
ground forces posed the primary threat to Israel’s existence, IDF ground forces were seen 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Gawrych, The 1973 Arab-Israeli War, 2. 
14 Ibid, 6.  
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as the key to victory on the battlefield and thus to the survival of the state. For this 
reason, the IDF was structured primarily around its armored ground forces. In 1967, after 
achieving breakthroughs in eastern Sinai, armored brigades led by tanks with little or no 
infantry support spearheaded the IDF advance across the Sinai desert.15 The IDF’s 
success rested on the ability of its tactical commanders to demonstrate initiative in 
combat while Israeli tank crews exhibited mastery of fire and movement over their 
Egyptian counterparts. The Israelis were left with the impression that wars on the ground 
were won by armor and armor alone. Thus, after the war, the Israeli General Staff placed 
an even greater emphasis on armor in budget allocations, doctrine, organization, and 
tactics. Tank-heavy armored brigades, lacking in well-trained mechanized infantry, 
became the norm. As a result, the Israeli military failed to develop an integrated infantry-
armor doctrine, and effectively eschewed the use of infantry. Infantry and artillery 
experienced a concomitant neglect. This was epitomized by the IDF’s abandonment of 
the flexible task force as its division organizational concept, in favor of the armored 
division. Indeed, a number of infantry brigades were converted to armor units. To 
compensate for a tank-heavy doctrine for land warfare, the Israeli General Staff counted 
on the Israeli Air Force quickly gaining air superiority and then serving as “flying 
artillery” for ground forces.16 
In essence, the IDF was prepared to fight the last war, the 1967 Six Day War. 
Rather than develop a more balanced force structure centered on combined arms, Israeli 
doctrine and strategy relied upon what worked best in 1967: intelligence, the air force, 
and tanks. This dynamic trinity would carry the fight into the enemy’s territory in 	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decisive fashion. The Israeli military leadership assumed confidently that the Arabs 
would wage Israel’s kind of war; one fought over open terrain pitting air and armor 
forces directly against each other. Not only did the Israelis expect to fight the last war, 
they also expected a repeat command performance. Given a huge advantage in aerial 
capabilities and technology, Israeli leaders did not foresee any significant threat of 
prolonged conflict from neighboring Arab countries, but rather quick and decisive Israeli 
victories.17 
Projecting their own concept of a war’s outcome with the Arabs, the Israeli 
government found it inconceivable that the armies of an Arab coalition would risk 
“inevitable” defeat in war. For example, because Israel held air supremacy in such high 
regard, it was natural to assume that any enemy would do the same. Furthermore, as a 
prerequisite prior to attempting a major ground assault against Israel, the assumption was 
made that an enemy would require the destruction of the Israeli Air Force. It did not 
make sense to the Israelis that a nation would go to war with a purpose short of total 
military victory. In presuming that what was good for Israel, the same must also be good 
for the enemy; it was inconceivable that the Arabs would be planning a major 
coordinated offensive. 
Arab forces in general, and the Egyptians in particular, did not rest on 
assumptions based upon their experiences in the Six Day War. Working from a basis of 
self recognized inferiority with respect to Israeli operational concepts, the Egyptians “re-
interpreted the concepts of superiority.”18 Operationally, the Israeli’s sought to 	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offensively seize control of the air and ground environment. Whereas the Israelis 
envisioned control of the skies as involving aircraft and skilled pilots, the Egyptians saw 
SAMs as their weapon of denial. Thus while Israel continued to view air power as 
deterrence, Arab armies were able to overcome Israel’s deterrent posture. What Israelis 
had perceived as an unacceptable risk had been reduced to a calculated one on the part of 
Egypt and Syria. A similar strategy was pursued by Arab nations with regard to armored 
ground forces. The Israelis fought a maneuver based tank war emphasizing speed, 
firepower, and tactical air support. As long as Israeli forces could dictate the dynamic 
mobile style of tank warfare at which they excelled, they held a clear advantage. The 
Egyptians and Syrians thus opted for infantry carried anti-tank weapons and shoulder 
fired anti-aircraft missiles. Egyptian and Syrian planners decided to secure control over 
the battlefield by negative rather than positive means. Evading battle on Israel’s own 
terms, they ordained their own rule, the Wellingtonian peninsular approach of strategic 
offense combined with tactical defense: 
Egypt’s goals in initiating the 1973 war were to discredit the “Israeli 
Security Theory”… They learned their own limitations and designed an 
operation that supported their own strengths and nullified the IDF’s 
strengths. Egypt would secure a lodgment on the east bank of the Suez, 
reduce Israeli forces through defensive tactics and Soviet anti-tank guided 
missile- launchers (ATGMs), and protect their force while destroying 
Israeli planes with an advanced surface-to-air missile (SAM) network that 
was pushed eastward to the canal banks… Israeli air force strength was 
negated by Egypt’s SAM umbrella, and armor that did react to the fight 
initially was heavily attrited by Egyptian ATGMs.19 
 
Egyptian planning would prove extremely effective in the 1973 war, forcing the IDF and 
Israel to essentially “adapt or die.” 
  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Billmyer, The IDF: Tactical Success - Strategic Failure, 36-37. 
   44	  
Operations in the Sinai Theater  
The Yom Kippur War, also known as the October War, was launched at 1400 hours on 
the afternoon October 6, 1973, when Egyptian infantry crossed the Suez Canal and 
assaulted Israeli defensive positions on the east bank, composing the Bar-Lev Line.20 The 
Egyptians made a highly successful crossing of the Suez Canal along a broad front, 
enveloping most of the Israeli defensive positions. Simultaneously, on Israel’s 
northeastern border, Syrian armor attacked Israeli positions along the Golan Heights. In 
the Golan, Syrian tanks penetrated nearly eight miles into Israeli territory over the course 
of two days before the IDF was able to stabilize the battlefield and prepare to 
counterattack. The coordinated attack came as an almost complete surprise to Israel. 
In the Sinai, the Egyptians had planned a three-phased operation. The first phase 
entailed the crossing of the canal along a broad front by infantry divisions assigned to the 
2nd and 3rd Armies in order to secure divisional-sized bridgeheads. Phase two included a 
consolidation of the bridgeheads in a temporary transition to the defensive in order to 
defeat the expected IDF counterattack. After securing footholds along the east bank 
involving mechanized and armored divisions, phase three would see a continued attack 
by the mechanized and armored divisions to reach operational objectives by pushing into 
the Sinai to cut of Israeli lines of communication and supply.21  
Following their plan for a broad front crossing, the Egyptians quickly pushed 
across the canal and were able to establish divisional-sized bridgeheads on the east bank 
of the canal. Between October 8th and October 14th, the Egyptian armies consolidated and 	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defended their positions along the east bank of the Suez, and continued to push armored 
forces across the Suez into the bridgehead.22 In response, Israeli Southern Command, still 
relying on the doctrine of continuous offensive action with armored forces, directed 
counterattacks to gain a foothold back on the canal in order to shift combat operations to 
Egyptian territory. However, these counterattacks were poorly coordinated and failed to 
achieve their objectives. This inability to respond to unforeseen threats played a major 
role in the defeat of early Israeli counterattacks and the tremendous loss of troops and 
equipment. 
According to Williamson Murray, intellectual discourse over the nature of 
operational and tactical choices facing the IDF did not take place at the onset of Egyptian 
offensive, as “nothing was occurring more than a dialogue of the deaf.”23 IDF leaders 
were still constrained by their previous successes against Arab armies, unable to rethink 
their pre-war assumptions. Had they recognized that they were facing an entirely new 
situation and context, they may possibly have acted sooner to withdraw to the Sinai 
passes, call up reserves, integrate combat units, fight mobile tank battles, and move out of 
range of Egyptian SAMs. 
Finally, a realization occurred that counterattacks should be halted, and allow 
Egyptians to attempt a breakout. The IDF refrained from conducting further 
counterattacks and prepared to defeat the Egyptian attacks that followed. This decision 
was controversial among the Israeli commanders, with Israeli strategic culture suggesting 
seizing the initiative from the Egyptians attempting to re-cross the Suez and attack into 
the operational depth of the Egyptian armies. Rather, the IDF settled into a holding 	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action, allowing the Egyptians to retain the initiative at both the tactical and operational 
level.24  
The Egyptian momentum had been halted. After crossing the Canal with 
their tanks, the Egyptians had left much of their logistical support on the 
other side. Harassed by Israeli attacks, it was difficult to expend concerted 
effort in ensuring the transport and delivery of the assets needed to sustain 
an advance through the Sinai. In effecting a brilliant and rapid crossing of 
the Suez Canal, the Egyptians had gone past the culminating point of 
victory. The initiative they had grasped by crossing the canal was now 
being transferred to the strengthened Israeli forces.25 
 
With the Egyptian operational pause after the second phase of their operation, the 
initiative quickly changed over to the Israelis, culminating with the disastrous Egyptian 
attack toward strategically important Mitla and Gidi Passes on the 14th. The result was a 
massive Egyptian defeat as the IDF brought to bear its qualitative superiority of 
personnel and equipment, and exhibited its offensive ethos against the attacking Egyptian 
forces. This dramatically reversed the trajectory of the war, as the IDF was able to initiate 
Operation STOUTHEARTED MEN on October 14th, cross the Suez Canal, and take the 
fight beyond the Sinai and into Egypt. By October 18th, the IDF had defeated two 
Egyptian armies and controlled territory on the African continent.26 
 
Technological Surprise  
According to Dr. Martin Gawrych, the surprise achieved by Egypt and Syria was 
complete, stunning virtually everyone in Israel.27 The Egyptians and Syrians surprised 
Israel not only in the timing of their attack but also in another important area: technology. 
Egypt and Syria had received large quantities of modern weapon systems from their 	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Soviet allies, most notably the SA-6 and SA-7 SAMs.28 Having experienced the ability of 
the Israeli Air Force (IAF) to provide overwhelming close air support and battlefield air 
interdiction, the Egyptians deployed SAMs to provide an integrated air defense umbrella 
over the Sinai Theater. This umbrella was intended to deny the IAF the air supremacy 
which had been a critical element of the Israeli victory in the 1967 war, and which the 
Egyptians had identified as the single greatest threat to a surprise crossing of the 
canal. 
The system that proved most decisive in achieving technological surprise, perhaps 
greater than the SAMs, was the Sagger anti-tank guided missile (ATGM). The Sagger, a 
first generation ATGM system, is a wire-guided missile with a shaped charge warhead 
that was capable of penetrating Israeli armor. While adaptable to almost any armored 
vehicle, Egyptian forces deployed the man-packed and ground-mounted “suitcase” 
version of the Sagger.29 These Sagger firing teams were typically composed of 3 soldiers; 
one man was the senior gunner who fired the missiles; the second was the junior gunner 
who assisted in the system checkout procedures and deployed nearby to protect the 
gunner; the third man moved well forward of the firing position with an RPG-7 to engage 
the target if the Sagger failed to hit its target.30 Although accuracy is a function of the 
operator’s skill, the thoroughness of training for the Egyptian gunners resulted in high 
levels of system accuracy. With an abundance of Saggers, Egyptian forces established a 
defense that lured IDF armor into a kill zone in order to optimize the potential of both 
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Saggers and RPG-7s.31 These kill zones works by placing great numbers of camouflaged 
RPG-7s and Saggers forward of Egyptian tanks. IDF tank crews saw Egyptian tanks in 
the far distance and closed to do battle, unaware of threat awaiting them. In an after 
action report, an Israeli tank commander voiced the effectiveness of such tactics:  
“We were advancing and in the distance I saw specks dotted on the sand 
dunes. I couldn't make out what they were. As we got closer, I thought 
they looked like tree stumps. They were motionless and scattered across 
the terrain ahead of us. I got on the intercom and asked the tanks ahead 
what they made of it. One of my tank commanders radioed back: ‘My 
God, they're not tree stumps. They're men!’ For a moment I couldn’t 
understand. What were men doing standing out there—quite still-when 
we were advancing in our tanks towards them? Suddenly all hell broke 
loose. A barrage of missiles was being fired at us. Many of our tanks 
were hit. We had never come up against anything like this before.”32 
 
The effect of these modern antitank weapons in this war was devastating. Not 
since the Battle of Kursk between the German and Russians in World War II has there 
been a comparable loss of tanks in such a short period of time.33 These losses were 
largely due to the fact that in the first several days of the 1973 war, Israeli armor units, 
advancing without close air, infantry, or artillery support, attacked in the face of large 
numbers of Soviet-made Saggers. Conservative estimates of IDF tank losses in the Sinai 
Theater are in the range of 800-900 tanks, with approximately 25% attributed to 
ATGMs.34 
While the IDF had modernized its weapons, its doctrine remained tied to previous 
engagements. This culminated in an Israeli failure to recognize the limits of technology, 
and more importantly, a failure to develop tactics and doctrine appropriate for a wide 	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range of situations. Although the IDF was fully aware of the supply of these weapons to 
the Arab armies, the way and quantity in which the weapons were deployed and their 
combat effect on the Israeli center of gravity was unanticipated. Ultimately, the Egyptians 
achieved their strategic goal of inflicting heavy casualties on the IDF and undermining 
the public’s perception of Israeli invincibility.  
 
Israeli Adaptation 
Israel misjudged the ability of the Arabs to changes operations and tactics between 1967 
and 1973. Consequently, the IDF was very nearly beaten in the first forty-eight hours of 
battle: 
On the 8th of October [1973], the Israeli Defense Forces had been 
operationally defeated. Strategically, the Nation still survived but its 
armed forces were badly mauled. Great distances separated the two fronts 
and movement of the reserves, once mobilized, was slow.35 
 
However, under the pressure of combat in adverse circumstances, IDF forces made 
significant combat adaptations in a short period by modifying tactics to employ the 
combined arms team of infantry, armor, and artillery. They adapted with considerable 
agility, and managed to reverse the initiative of the invading armies while dramatically 
reducing the effectiveness of Sagger and other ATGM systems.  
At both the tactical and operational level, the IDF was seriously hindered in its 
ability to fight the deep battle by its doctrine and force structure. Israeli commanders did, 
however, understand the need to engage the enemy in a deep battle, and proposed as early 
as October 8th to conduct a divisional sized crossing of the canal in order to engage the 
Egyptians in depth early in the campaign. The ultimate Israeli success was largely a result 	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of the recognition of the vulnerability of the Egyptian operational rear because of the lack 
of an operational armored reserve on the west bank of the canal.36 Particularly important 
was the ability of the Israeli leadership at the theater and senior tactical level to read the 
battlefield and seize the initiative that the Egyptians handed the IDF when they paused on 
the east bank of the Suez. 
Several tactical adjustments also directly contributed to the battlefield victory. 
First, the role of IDF infantry in operations shifted to a combined arms approach in 
serving close fire support for advancing armor. Infantry continued to fight mounted, 
except when heavy enemy antitank fire prevented forward movement. For armored forces 
in particular, one tank in a 3-tank platoon was designated to watch for Sagger missiles 
being fired at the platoon.37 This tank would attempt to determine, if possible, which tank 
was being fired upon, give an immediate warning over the radio, and then immediately 
fire the main tank gun at the point from which the Sagger was fired. These tactics were 
designed to disrupt the Sagger gunner sufficiently to cause him to overcorrect and 
thereby lose control of the missile. By firing artillery on likely or suspected locations for 
Saggers and employing infantry with tanks to add suppressive fire to Sagger and RPG-7 
positions, the effectiveness of the ATGMs was significantly reduced.38 
Another tactical initiative employed was that the tank being fired upon would take 
evasive maneuvers or move to cover before the missile impacted. After the war, Israeli 
tank crews reported that they were generally successful in dodging the missile once 
Sagger watch tactics were implemented. Several types of dodges were implemented, 
including immediate moves to natural cover, or simply backing down from a hull defilade 	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firing position to a complete hull down position. Next was a violent turn to the right or 
left at the last few seconds of missile flight, as it was difficult for the Sagger gunner to 
correct for sudden, sharp moves by his target. Finally, tank platoons began to maneuver 
in erratic path designed to cause Sagger gunners to over correct and thus lose control of 
their missiles.39 
IDF tactical and operational adjustments went into effect starting with the war’s 
turning point on October 15th. IDF Southern Command launched its counterattack to 
secure a foothold on the west side of the canal. Southern Command took the opportunity 
handed them by the Egyptian pause and failed third phase of operations, and in 
accordance with strategic culture, seized the initiative with their rapid drive across the 
canal and into the operational rear of the Egyptians. In a daring tactical move laden with 
risk, future Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s armored division secured a bridgehead on the 
west bank on October 16th.40 This ability to rapidly shift from the defense to an offensive 
posture demonstrated remarkable agility on the part of the IDF operational and tactical 
commanders.  
Two days later the Southern Command exploited the bridgehead with a two-
division force that maneuvered into the operational areas of the 2nd and 3rd Egyptian 
armies. Far less responsive was the Egyptian chain of command in dealing with the IDF 
penetration to the west bank of the canal. In a gross misreading of the battlefield, the high 
command of the Egyptian Army failed to realize the significance of the IDF penetration 
and so failed to release strategic reserves or transfer armored units from the east to the 
west bank in order to deal with the Israeli threat. The result was that by October 22nd, the 	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Israelis had cut off the 3rd Army and were threatening the rear of the 2nd Army and the 
Egyptian capital. Further, the drive into the rear areas of the Egyptians had enabled the 
IDF to eliminate much of the SAM umbrella upon which Egyptian command of the air 
had been based, enabling the IAF to establish air superiority over the theater. On October 
24th, a United Nations cease-fire was proclaimed which ended the war.41 
The 1973 war exposed major shortcomings in the ground forces, beginning with 
Israeli armor. Subsequent to the war, the IDF improved tank firepower and survivability 
with the development of an improved antitank round, the addition of reactive armor, and 
the fitting of automatic smoke projectors, machine guns, and a turret-mounted 60mm 
mortar.42 More broadly, however, the IDF recognized the need to move toward a more 
balanced combined arms force if the tank were to retain its dominance on the 
battlefield.43 The IDF had to strengthen its infantry, combat engineering, and artillery 
capabilities to enable the tank to operate effectively on the modern battlefield. Since it 
was demonstrated that the IAF might not always be available to support the ground 
battle, obliging ground combat units to rely instead on field artillery for fire support, 
artillery was modernized with the procurement of new target-acquisition means and 
automated fire control systems.44 The IDF concluded that the tank and fighter were still 
essential but that their survivability on the modern battlefield could not be taken for 
granted. 
 
Analysis 	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From initial battlefield performances, it is evident that Israel had no system of net 
assessment in place, and rather made a host of implicit net assessments that shaped their 
behavior. As a result, IDF planners failed in the area of comparative assessment of 
doctrine and effectiveness.45 In particular, assessment failed with respect to two Egyptian 
tactical-operational adjustments; effectiveness of the SAM belt along the Suez Canal, and 
the impact of ATGMs against Israeli armor. The IDF was well aware that the Egyptian 
possessed SAM and ATGM systems prior to the beginning of combat operations. Yet 
Israeli strategists demonstrated an inability to mentally match likely enemy action with 
the range of likely Israeli reactions, as well as to predict enemy moves.  
Similarly, the IDF’s overwhelming commitment to offensive operations not only 
led to inappropriate operations, but overconfidence. Ultimately, the Israeli understanding 
of what would work and what would not, such as what kinds of interactions would occur 
between systems like armored ground forces and Egyptian ATGMs, diverged sharply 
from the realities of the battlefield. Even after the recognition of battlefield realities, there 
was no concerted effort on the part of the IDF Southern Command to address the ATGM 
threat. This refutes the realist explanation, despite the clear incentive for change, given 
the lack of theater-wide directives coupled with simply trying to prevent further losses 
and Egyptian advance. This does not imply an endorsement of organizational theory, as 
bottom-up field adjustments became the in-theater norm. The explanation for the Israeli 
response to the Egyptian surprise occurs between the extremes of complete action 
according to realism and inaction according to organizational theory.  
Despite major setbacks not only on the battlefield but also by the psychological 
shock to the national spirit, the brilliant adaptive capacity of Israeli field commanders 	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redeemed the initials defeats of the first few days of combat. This adaptive capacity 
facilitated a tremendous recovery at the tactical and operational levels, despite reflecting 
an intellectual deficiency in Western military concepts. The seminal role of Israeli 
officers suggests a major role played by bureaucratic politics in determining the Israeli 
response to the ATGM threat and the larger situation on the ground. One could argue that 
these officers resemble Rosen’s mavericks, actively taking responsibility into their own 
hands despite input from regional or central command.  
However, these officers were not attempting to change Israeli military policy but 
rather operated according to the IDF norm of encouraging field commanders to seize the 
tactical and operational initiative. Therefore, the role of individual commanders is 
indicative of the larger Israeli strategic culture of decentralization in command and 
empowerment of field commanders to adapt to battlefield circumstances and seize the 
initiative whenever possible. Specifically in combating ATGMs, strategic culture offers 
the best explanation for the ability of IDF forces to overcome the technological surprise 
through tactical initiative and ingenuity. These qualities are imbued in Israeli officer 
culture, further strengthening the case of strategic culture over bureaucratic politics.  
While Israel was able to overcome the tactical and operational surprise, its 
adaptations couldn’t compensate for changes in strategic nature of war. Israeli force 
structure as informed by strategic culture was significantly deficient in several key areas, 
which seriously limited the IDF’s adaptive capacity. As a result, its ability to deal with 
unforeseen threats and to fight the battle throughout the operational depth of the 
battlefield was greatly hampered. The result was a campaign that was primarily fought as 
a close battle, which served to lengthen the campaign and raise the casualty rates 
   55	  
significantly. Thus, despite the eventual tactical and operational success of the IDF, the 
Egyptians were able to achieve the strategic goal of eliminated the seeming invincibility 
of the IDF. A key operational lesson can be taken from this simple premise; never assume 
that any future opponent has accepted the status quo imposed upon him on the basis of 
past operational victories. 
 
Conclusion 
Following the 1973 war, the Israeli defense establishment developed a variety of 
technical and operational responses to the challenges of what they termed “the saturated 
battlefield.”46 Where previously Israel had sought to defeat its enemies by mobile 
operations and indirect attacks in the open field, it now faced enemies bristling with 
modern antitank defenses arrayed in depth, with limited avenues for flank attacks. Yet 
while seemingly learning the lessons of the 1973 War, Israel would face a similar 
situation nearly 30 years later. The 2006 war against Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon 
featured the primary system that surprised and wreaked havoc on the IDF in 1973: anti-
tank weapons. Despite being employed by adversaries on different ends of the military 
spectrum, the Egyptians as a conventional military and Hezbollah as a guerilla force, 
ATGMs again served as game changers.  
Like Egypt, Hezbollah sought to attack the militarily and technologically stronger 
opponent using asymmetric means. Realizing the capabilities of the Merkava, Hezbollah 
allocated their most advanced weaponry to combat this advanced tank, firing more than 
1,000 anti-tank rockets at Israeli armor and infantry. In the difficult terrain of southern 
Lebanon, the IDF faced older ATGMs like the AT-3 Sagger that they had encountered in 	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the Sinai in ‘73. The IDF also faced far more advanced weapons like the tube-launched, 
optically tracked, wire-guided TOW, and the Russian AT-14 Kornet, both third-
generation systems that can be used to attack tanks fitted with explosive reactive armor as 
well as bunkers, buildings, and entrenched troops.47 
ATGMs caused most of the IDF casualties in the war, nearly all the Armored 
Corps’ casualties, and many from the infantry units. A total of 500 Merkava tanks were 
committed to combat; five were destroyed by powerful underbelly mines, with 45 to 50 
more (roughly 10 percent of the total number of tanks committed to the ground fighting 
by the IDF) hit by ATGMs.48 According to a leading Israeli defense analyst: 
We knew the organization had advanced anti-tank rockets; the IDF’s 
Military Intelligence even acquired one. We also understood that 
Hezbollah was positioning anti-tank units; however, we failed to 
understand the significance of the mass deployment of these weapons. 49  
 
Similar to 1973 when Israeli intelligence badly underestimated the number of Saggers in 
Egyptian possession, Israeli intelligence did not have an accurate estimation of the 
inventory of the prewar Hezbollah holdings of these munitions or their associated tactics. 
It is clear that Israel made many of the same mistakes in 2006 as they did in 1973. 
During the several years prior to the conflict, in which the bulk of the IDF was constantly 
engaged in low intensity urban counter terrorist warfare in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 
all regular forces, including tanks crews were retrained for small unit infantry policing 
activities, which was mostly dismounted action. Armored-unit training was neglected, as 
was efforts to integrate air and ground operations. This proved regretful when Israeli 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Cordesman, Anthony. Lessons of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War. Washington, D.C.: Center 
for Strategic and International Studies, 2007: 119.  
48 Ibid, 45.  
49 Ibid, 121.  
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tankers had to quickly re-adapt to traditional procedures during combat.50 In addition, just 
prior to the conflict, IDF operational doctrine that came online in April 2006 was heavily 
technology-oriented. It stressed the role of firepower over maneuver, as well as achieving 
battlefield success via a combination of accurate, standoff fire, and limited operations on 
the ground.51 Thus IDF forces operated under the impression of the strengthening of 
firepower on the battlefield at the expense of maneuver, similar to Israeli forces prior to 
the 1973 War. 
While the threat posed by Hezbollah weapons and tactics as well as Israeli 
preconceived notions of what combat would look like bear stark resemblance to 
operations in the Sinai 30 years earlier, the notable difference between conflicts is the 
IDF response. Operating within a strategic culture almost identical to that of 1973, the 
IDF faced an irregular enemy with dispersed forces in a combat theater far more 
conducive to enemy operations than the open ground of the Sinai. As a result, there was 
no creative adaptation made by combat commanders to turn the tide of the engagement. 
Rather, hostilities ended in a stalemate, largely representing a defeat for the IDF.  
Israel will likely encounter Hezbollah forces on the battlefield in the next decade, 
as well as Hamas in Gaza and terrorist cells in the West Bank and Sinai. Inferior 
opponents will seize on the effectiveness of Hezbollah’s tactics, like the Egyptians 
decades earlier, and employ asymmetric capabilities in order to limit power disparities. 
The Israeli case should serve as a warning against a strategic culture that places an 
overreliance on technology in general and on airpower or network-centric warfare in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Eshel, Col. David. “Assessing the Performance of Merkava Tanks.” Defense-Update, 2007. 
http://defense-update.com/analysis/lebanon_war_3.htm.  
51 Kober, Avi. “The Israel Defense Forces in the Second Lebanon War: Why the Poor 
Performance?” Journal of Strategic Studies 31, no. 1 (February 2008): 18. 
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particular. In addition, the illusion that modern militaries like the IDF can rely on 
technology to eliminate friction, decrease the dependence on logistics, and break the 
enemy’s will, should be quickly dispelled. Instead, Western and modern militaries must 
put a premium on developing a strategic culture that prizes adaptation and flexibility in 
order to overcome battlefield surprises as well as their own misconceived notions of 
future conflicts. 
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Chapter 3 
The Soviets, Stinger, and Afghanistan     
 
For today it is not only the business of commanders to think up new 
techniques, which will destroy the value of the old; the potentialities of 
warfare are themselves being continually changed by technical advance. 
Thus the modern army commander must free himself from routine 
methods and show a comprehensive grasp of technical matters, for he 
must be in a position continually to adapt his ideas of warfare to the facts 
and possibilities of the moment. If circumstances require it, he must be 
able to turn the whole structure of his thinking inside out.1 
 
Field Marshall Erwin Rommel 
 
Introduction  
This chapter analyzes the Soviet response to the Mujahedeen deployment of the Stinger 
surface-to-air missile (SAM) during their decade-long engagement in Afghanistan from 
1979-1989. As in the previous chapter that identified an “Israeli way of war,” this chapter 
begins with an explanation of the “Soviet way of war” as a product of Soviet strategic 
culture. This is demonstrated through an analysis of Soviet strategic culture as well as a 
discussion of the quandary Soviet forces found themselves in soon after deploying to 
Afghanistan. This is followed by an analysis of the technological surprise embodied by 
the Stinger SAM, and the Soviet response during the remainder of the conflict. The 
chapter culminates in an evaluation of the theories explaining the Soviet reaction to the 
Stinger threat, concluding that while organizational theory provides a partial explanation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Dunn, Richard J. From Gettysburg to the Gulf and beyond: Coping with Revolutionary 
Technological Change in Land Warfare. Honolulu, Hi.: University Press of the Pacific, 2005: 19-
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for the Soviet response as opposed to realism and bureaucratic politics, strategic culture 
accounts for the greatest scope of the Soviet reactions.  
 
Soviet Strategic Culture 
From the origins of the Soviet Union to the end of the Cold War, several reoccurring 
patterns of Soviet military activity are discernible. First, Soviet political and military 
leaders and Russian strategic culture has from earliest times prized and exploited the 
great masses of seemingly limitless military manpower. Military leaders recognized that 
Soviet military capabilities were dependent on this manpower, and relied heavily on it. 
However, they maintained a relative indifference to casualties (as demonstrated in both 
World Wars) and encouraged relative indifference to the living conditions of its troops. 
Exploiting manpower required not only very large standing forces, but also maintenance 
of a huge, conscripted but only rudimentarily trained mobilization base, and a military 
industrial base to arm it. Additionally, the educational level of the manpower base was far 
too low to master technology of the late 20th century and was characterized by a low 
technical-culture capacity when measured against Soviet requirements for modern war. In 
other words, despite the large numbers of conscripts, their mastery of modern technology 
was far below that of a modern military. 
The second pattern characterizing the Soviet military was the fading of 
distinctions between military fronts and rears that followed the development of new 
technologies in the 20th century. These technologies, including the advancement of 
airpower, increased the pace of change in modern weaponry. In keeping with the Soviet 
obsession of contiguous theaters of battle and their need to seize them rapidly, the Soviets 
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were most interested in the trend towards the motorization of infantry; motorization made 
possible swifter and deeper offensive operations. Soviet force building by their General 
Staff in the early Cold War period concentrated on creating a force structure 
characterized by large mobile and armor-protected forces that could carry the offensive to 
great depths, in particular, Europe, the Far East, and Southwest Asia, the three contiguous 
land theaters.2  
This was done at the expense of other strategies involving air power and naval 
systems, which were neglected in favor of a doctrinal and industrial focus on deep land 
battles. The catering of technology to a desired force structure indicates a degree of 
Soviet social determinism with regards to military technology. The USSR pursued the 
opposite, or a technological backwardness, of the techno-centric American approach to 
warfare. Standard Soviet practice involved the development of doctrine and the 
subsequent devising of force structure to conform to the CONOPS. At the end of this 
process, the necessary technology was identified and developed in order to match 
practical needs rather than to achieve a degree of technological sophistication. Similarly, 
the Soviets focused persistently on combined arms combat, making all branches of 
service and weapons work jointly for a common military objective. No single service or 
weapons system occupied a wholly dominant role. Unlike Western forces, weapon 
systems were regarded as mass multipliers rather than as a means to improve force 
effectiveness during battle.3 Due to the Soviet cultural tolerance for casualties, officials 
did not share in the American belief that platforms could take place of human operators. 
This resulted in a Soviet strategic culture with poorly developed western concepts of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Ibid, 120. 
3 Glantz, David, and Lester Grau. The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in 
Afghanistan. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996: xii-xiii.  
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tactical creativity, flexibility, and capacity for independent action. Thus throughout the 
1970s, U.S. perceptions of Soviet ground force tactics stressed a general lack of initiative 
and flexibility in their military doctrine.4 
The expression of Soviet strategic culture in military power and foreign policy 
behavior, reached a peak in the mid-to-late 1970s. Soviet political and military leaders 
came to believe that they had achieved or were on the way to achieving a strategic 
superiority over the West based on robust strategic nuclear forces, theater force 
superiority in both conventional and nuclear capabilities, and the beginnings of the ability 
to project force beyond the Eurasian continent. Equally important, they came to believe, 
especially after America’s withdrawal from Vietnam, that “historic trends in the global 
correlation of forces”- military, political, and ideological- were in their favor.5 They 
viewed their strategic status as a platform from which they could conduct more assertive 
and ambitious foreign policies in the Third World to win new allies and dependents, and 
in Europe to detach traditional allies from the United States.6  
During this late Cold War period, Soviet theorists displayed a deep theoretical 
grasp of the nature and strategic management of warfare through an elaborate, integrated 
system of thought. Strategic and doctrinal concepts were precisely defined, and each had 
its place in a hierarchy of importance corresponding to its military decision-making level. 
This is demonstrated in the Soviet formulation of military science. According to the 
Soviet Dictionary of Basic Military Terms, military science is a system of knowledge 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Frketic, Maj. John. Soviet Actions in Afghanistan and Initiative at the Tactical Level: Are There 
Implications for the U.S. Army? Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 
United States Army Command and General Staff College, December 6, 1988: 30.  
5 Ermarth, Fritz. Russia’s Strategic Culture: Past, Present, And... in Transition? Comparative 
Strategic Cultures. Advanced Systems and Concepts Office: Defense Threat Reduction Agency, 
October 31, 2006: 10. 
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concerning the nature, essence, and content of armed conflict and concerning the 
manpower, facilities, and methods for conducting combat operations with armed forces 
and their comprehensive support.7 It derives its findings from training exercises, human 
behavior, physical sciences, technology, and industry, all factors that form Soviet 
strategic culture. These findings became the foundation for the Soviet armed forces’ 
military doctrine, which can be defined as the accepted system of scientifically founded 
views on the nature of modern wars and the use of the armed forces in them. 
Consequently, the concept of military science established a direct connection between 
strategic culture and Soviet doctrine in devising a Soviet way of war. However, 
consistently defining the Soviet way of war was qualitatively inferiority. There existed an 
inability to turn strategic concepts and material visions into reality due to limited 
economic and political capital afforded by Communist ideology. Therefore, while unique 
in their innate ability for strategic planning, the USSR was never able to take advantage 
of such vision.  
Perhaps one of the most important factors that influenced Soviet military science 
was the study of historical experiences in war. Accordingly, the orientation of Soviet 
strategic culture was anchored in the past, unlike the traditional American orientation 
towards the future of combat. In the 1970s, the Soviet big-war model culminated with the 
development of the land-air battle concept that relied on technology to conduct modern 
combined arms battle fought throughout the depth of the enemy battle formation.8 By the 
late 1970s, the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union were structured, equipped, and trained 
for high-intensity war on the northern plains of both Europe and China against a modem 	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8 The Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics. Field Manual. Washington, D.C.: Department of the 
Army, July 16, 1984. 
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enemy who would occupy defensive positions stretching across said plains. The Soviet 
Army planned to contend with these defensive belts through the weight of massed 
artillery fires, and then advance through the gap created to strike deep at enemy lines of 
supply and communications.9  
This big war approach was characterized by heavy tank and mechanized 
formations, massed and echeloned to conduct breaches of dense defenses, followed by 
rapid advance into the enemy rear to encircle and destroy him. These offensives were 
supported by air-ground attack, long-range artillery, and airmobile assaults throughout 
the depth of the enemy defense.10 Tactics were designed for rapid implementation by 
conscripts and reservists and to operate within the context of the larger strategic 
operation. Spacing between vehicles and the ability to dismount a BMP personnel carrier, 
form a squad line, and provide suppressive small-arms fire were prized components of 
motorized rifle tactics. However, tactical initiative was not encouraged, as it tended to 
upset operational timing.11 The increased conventionalization of Soviet forces in 
preparation for large-scale land engagements with a peer competitor like the United 
States did not come to fruition, however, as the final military engagement for the Soviet 
Union devolved into a quagmire ill-suited for the conventional capabilities the Soviets 
had been developing since the end of WWII.   
 
War in Afghanistan, 1979-1989 
In December 1979, Soviet forces conducted a conventional assault on Kabul and other 
key points in Afghanistan with the aim of creating a stable Soviet-friendly government 	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and quelling insurrection. The Soviet military strategy for the invasion of Afghanistan 
was time-tested and based on interventions from the decades following WWII. The 
overarching strategy in December 1979 was a determination to limit the level of its 
military commitment and focus on the transformation and employment of the Democratic 
Republic of Afghanistan’s (DRA) army. As a result, a plan of occupation was not 
feasible, nor was it ever considered. The USSR relied upon speed, surprise, deception, 
and overwhelming offensive force to address military objectives both sequentially and 
simultaneously. Adequate resources were devoted to each objective in an environment 
nearly free of political and operational constraints, while well-planned and organized 
preparatory military actions of an indirect nature supported aggressively direct execution. 
As a result, an asymmetrically superior force was applied to a weak and surprised 
opposition. Yet almost a decade years later, Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan 
after suffering close to 14,000 killed, leaving behind a very precarious pro-Soviet 
government and an ongoing civil war.12 
The military situation that would confront the USSR in Afghanistan differed 
greatly from Soviet pre-war expectations based on their 1968 invasion of 
Czechoslovakia.13 The Afghan terrain, climate, and the enemy were entirely different 
from Soviet forces had prepared for; the army was geared for a high tempo, mechanized 
war with capabilities and competencies designed for the demands of operational art 
within the context of strategic offensive operations. In this locale, their equipment 
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functioned less than optimally, their force structure was clearly inappropriate, and their 
tactics were not suited for unconventional operations.14  
The Mujahedeen did not accommodate the Soviets by fighting a Northern 
European-plane war. Their success often owed much to Soviet and DRA adherence to 
stereotyped organization and tactics, incompetence, and excessive passivity that were all 
a product of strategic culture. For example, massed artillery and simple battle drills had 
little effect on the elusive guerrillas. In addition, excessive Soviet reliance on artillery and 
air-delivered firepower occurred at the expense of maneuver and dismounted infantry 
closings with the enemy. Motor rifle troops, especially DRA forces, were reluctant to 
leave their armored vehicles because of both a reluctance to engage in close quarter battle 
and a deficiency in training in dismounted operations.15 As a result they found a tactical 
situation where an allusive and lightly armed enemy melted into difficult mountainous 
terrain when confronted with superior force and reemerged to strike at isolated units and 
logistic convoys.16 Wise to Soviet failings, the Mujahedeen would “hug” the enemy as 
close as possible to make it impossible for him to use his artillery and attack helicopters.  
Early Soviet tactical and operational adjustments proved ineffective or 
inconclusive on the battlefield. Initial adaptations were hampered by systemic limitations 
of an army designed for a single variant of warfare. Company-level officers were taught 
only basic tactics unsuited to conditions in Afghanistan and were unskilled in such tasks 
as rapidly adjusting mortar or artillery fire. Low-level commanders often displayed little 
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capacity for independent action, lacked initiative, and often displayed poor leadership.17 
Conventional Soviet military strategy and operations continued to prove indecisive and 
constituted a significant drain on resources. At the same time, the Soviets were incapable 
of implementing an unconventional strategy against the Mujahedeen. Of the three tenets 
of the crude Soviet counterinsurgency doctrine- establishing a popular political 
organization, isolating insurgents from external support, and utilizing “terror tactics” to 
quell rebellion- only the latter was implemented to any effect.18 
Therefore, early Soviet operations did not aim as much at defeating the 
Mujahedeen as they did in intimidating and terrorizing populations in Mujahedeen-
controlled territory into abandoning areas of intense resistance and withdrawing support 
for the guerrillas. The methods and weapons employed- deliberate destruction of villages, 
high altitude carpet-bombing, napalm, and fragmentation bombs- testify to the intent of 
the Soviet military’s effort to terrorize the Afghan civilian population. These methods, 
together with a scorched-earth policy and the heavy mining of key highways and the 
perimeters of towns, resulted in the destruction of a large part of agricultural lands.19 As 
Stilwell argues, the Soviet inability to implement a viable counterinsurgency strategy 
effectively eliminated any chance of achieving stated political objectives or stemming the 
flow of foreign military assistance, primarily through Pakistan. This ensured that the 
resistance was able to keep pace with Soviet tactical and operational innovations. The use 
of the American-sourced Stinger missile system to counter the increased Soviet use of 	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heliborne forces and other aviation in support of conventional offensives is the best 
example of this failure.20 
Faced with this imposing security challenge, and burdened with a military 
doctrine, operational, and tactical techniques suited to theater war, the Soviet Army was 
hard pressed to devise military methodologies suited to deal with the Afghan challenges. 
Initially, there was no desire on the part of Soviet commanders to change the status quo 
of an army suited for a European war against its principal adversary. Thus during the first 
several years of the war, the Soviet mindset remained conventional in approach. 
Traditional Soviet strategic culture prevailed, producing a dangerous combination of 
rigidity, inflexibility, lack of aggressiveness, and an inability to maneuver effectively. 
For example, while Afghanistan proved ideal for light infantry forces, Soviet 
force structure centered on armor and motorized infantry. Motorized troops could not 
easily transition to light infantry because they were essentially married to their armored 
personnel carriers. In addition, the reliance on mechanized forces and massive firepower 
made the soldiers load so heavy that any movement on foot beyond their BMPs, 
especially given the terrain and heat in Afghanistan, would exhaust them. This new non-
linear battlefield required the abandonment of traditional operational and tactical 
formations, a redefinition of traditional echelonment concepts, and a wholesale 
reorganization of formations and units to emphasize combat flexibility and survivability. 
Lessons drawn from the first few years of the war included the need for rapid mobility 
and massive, responsive fire support, constituting a revision of traditional Soviet 
doctrinal precepts.  
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The massed use of heliborne operations by specially trained airborne and air 
assault forces to achieve a “vertical envelopment” of the battlefield soon established a 
new emphasis for Soviet operations.21 As a result, the 1980s witnessed a reevaluation of 
the Afghan Theater by Soviet commanders to produce greater flexibility at the 
operational and strategic levels. Elements of the Soviet 40th Army altered their concept of 
the theater strategic offensive, identified new concepts for shallower echelonment at all 
levels, developed the concept of the air echelon, and experimented with new force 
structures such as the corps, brigade, and combined arms battalion. The most effective 
adaptation was seen among Soviet airborne, air assault, and Spetznaz forces. These forces 
were at the center of improving Soviet counterinsurgency operations that relied on light 
airborne forces deployed along high ground and mountain passes in order to secure 
movement along axes of advance used by motorized infantry.22 The key technological 
system that facilitated this Soviet shift away from linear conventional conflict towards 
irregular and counterinsurgency operations was the helicopter-gunship, specifically the 
Mi-24 Hind.  
The Hind was the most widely used element of Soviet air power in the Afghan 
war. It was also the most dynamic feature of Soviet tactical operations during the war, 
providing a mobility of combat power that the Mujahedeen could not match. Though the 
Soviets were essentially in the infancy of determining how to use attack helicopters, they 
quickly realized their value as a fire support platform. The Soviet Union had 
experimented with armed versions of attack helicopters in the 1950s, but it was not until 
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the late 1960s that development began on the Mi-24.23 The idea of dedicated attack 
helicopters fermented as the shift from nuclear to conventional doctrine increased in the 
later Cold War period. Further, Soviet observation of the Vietnam War and the 1973 
Arab-Israeli War led to an operational concept of the Hind that focused almost 
exclusively on fire support. The result was an attack helicopter doctrine and tactical 
development, prior to the beginning of the war in Afghanistan, which was based on 
providing close air support for a variety of ground forces.24  
While the helicopter did not enable the Soviets to adapt from a conventionally 
oriented force to a truly counterinsurgency oriented force, it did help them bring the fight 
to the Mujahedeen more effectively. The terrain in Afghanistan had considerable 
influence on the use of the Hind. Many of the narrow roads in Afghanistan snake through 
valleys overlooked by steep, tall mountains. Like American forces in Vietnam, the USSR 
discovered Hinds to be extremely useful given the terrain due to their range, mobility, 
armament, and multiple capabilities.25  
Air assault forces were most effective when used in support of a mechanized 
ground attack. Heliborne detachments would land deep in the rear and flanks of 
Mujahedeen strongholds to isolate them, destroy bases, cut lines of communication, and 
block routes of withdrawal. The ground force would advance to link up with the 
heliborne forces.26 Soviet and DRA troops inserted by helicopter achieved surprise in a 
way that ground forces could rarely do. Attack helicopters could deliver a high volume of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Groenke, Andrew. “CAS, Interdiction, and Attack Helicopters.” Naval Postgraduate School, 
2005: 12.  
24 Ibid, 13.  
25 Nelson, LTC Denny. “Soviet Air Power: Tactics and Weapons Used in Afghanistan.” Air 
University Review 36, no. 1 (February 1985). 
26 Glantz, The Bear Went Over the Mountain, 203. 
   71	  
fire accurately against small, point targets that were invisible to tanks or artillery 
observers. Their arrival often silenced heavy weapons and was the signal for a break-off 
of Mujahedeen action and withdrawal.27  
However, airborne and air assault forces rarely operated at full strength. The 
Soviets never brought enough helicopters and air assault forces into the Afghan theater to 
perform all the necessary missions. For example, helicopter support was not routinely 
provides for convoys, while terrain along convoy routes was not always monitored and 
held by air assault forces, allowing Mujahedeen interdiction attacks.28 Ultimately, the 
lack of resources provided for the Soviet’s most effective system in combating the 
Mujahedeen would become evident in 1986 with the Mujahedeen’s achievement of 
technological surprise. 
 
Technological Surprise and the Stinger 
Like the U.S. years later in Iraq, the Soviet experience in Afghanistan demonstrates that 
qualitative superiority does not ensure victory, especially when the enemy employs an 
unexpected counter method or device to achieve battlefield parity. Consequently, attack 
helicopters were far from immune to the effects of enemy action. With time, the 
Mujahedeen developed tactics to counter the Soviet threat developed and eventually were 
able to employ weapons and air defense techniques that obviated portions of Soviet 
attack helicopter doctrine and tactics.  
Early in the war, helicopters were largely able to remain above or outside the 
engagement envelope of machine guns and light anti-aircraft artillery, while evaluating 	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their targets and then expose themselves for a brief period during their attacks. The first 
specific adaptation by the Mujahedeen to limit the capabilities was the rocket-propelled 
grenade (RPG). Before achieving technological surprise, the guerrillas had already shot 
down several hundred helicopters with well-placed machine guns and RPGs, modified 
with a fantail device that allowed the Mujahedeen to aim this shoulder-fired anti-tank 
weapon at airborne targets.29 These weapons were largely supplied by Pakistani 
intelligence services and Islamic militants in Pakistan’s tribal regions, just as the 
Afghanistan Taliban did during Operation Enduring Freedom.    
While the rebels proved remarkably committed, they incurred terrible losses 
under the Soviet strategy that took advantage of virtually complete Soviet dominance in 
the air to provide fire-power, reconnaissance, convoy security, tactical lift, mining, 
ambushes, and dismounted operations. Further, Mujahedin air defenses were ineffective. 
They were limited to heavy machine guns and a small quantity of unreliable, Soviet-
designed SA-7 SAMs obtained from defecting Afghan army troops or supplied covertly. 
Further, the effectiveness of modified RPGs decreased considerably as the Soviets 
improved their airborne assault tactics and integrated them with motorized infantry to 
suppress Mujahedeen movements.30 
In desperation, the Mujahedin and their supporters in the United States and 
Pakistan appealed to the American government to supply the rebels with an effective 
antiaircraft weapon to help level the playing field. In response, through the CIA and 
Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence, the U.S. supplied the Afghanis with the Stinger 
SAM. The shoulder-fired, heat-seeking Stinger was the state-of-the-art Man Portable Air 	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Defense System (MANPADS) at the time. With its maximum speed of 2.2 Mach and 
maximum effective range of 5.5 kilometers, the Stinger provided a quantum leap in 
performance over the SA-7 with a maximum speed of 1.4 Mach and maximum effective 
range of 3 kilometers. More importantly, the Stinger was an all-aspect missile while the 
SA-7 could only be launched from the rear quadrant of aircraft moving away from the 
missile operator.31 Overall, the Stinger’s superiority was due to several technological 
advantages. It required little training, was truly man-portable, weighed just 35 pounds, 
was a “fire-and-forget” weapon, was faster and had greater range than earlier SAMs, 
could attack fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters from any angle, and once locked on 
target, it could not be deflected by flares.32 
According to a post-war Washington Post article on the CIA’s effort to arm the 
Mujahedeen, the United States received highly specific, sensitive information about 
Kremlin politics and new Soviet war plans in Afghanistan in 1984 and 1985. This 
intelligence coup triggered the Reagan administration’s decision to escalate the covert 
program in Afghanistan by opening up its high-technology arsenal to aid the Afghan 
rebels.33 These efforts first came to fruition on September 25, 1986, when Mujahedin 
fighters fired their first five Stinger missiles, knocking three Soviet Mi-24 Hinds out of 
the sky.34 The introduction of the Stinger SAM, beginning in 1986 showed how guerrillas 
could inflict heavy losses against a regular industrialized army without having a high 
level of training and organization. The Mujahedeen were then able to undermine the key 	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Soviet technological advantage: the mobility and firepower of helicopters. The 
introduction of Stinger ended the Soviets’ ability to conduct heliborne operations and 
airborne operations with impunity, effectively reducing the Soviets’ greatest advantage of 
“owning the air”. The Soviet military had substituted airpower for large-scale troop 
deployments. The loss of freedom in the air left them with few available alternatives in 
interdicting insurgent operations. The image of Afghan resistance fighters shouldering 
Stinger missiles and shooting down Soviet aircraft became an icon for the later years of 
the Cold War era.  
The Stinger had an immediate military impact and achieved the effect of 
technological surprise. From a tactical perspective, although initial estimates were 
overblown in claiming that the Stinger downed approximately one aircraft per day during 
the first three months of its deployment, the missile clearly represented an enormous 
qualitative improvement in the rebels’ air-defense capability.35 In an interview towards 
the end of the war, a DRA defector said,  
“Before Stinger, we were free to do almost anything we wanted. After 
Stinger was introduced, we changed all our tactics, altitudes and speed- 
everything. We did not like to fly down low, and when we had to, we flew 
very fast, and even at high altitudes, we flew as fast as we could… We 
were no longer able to operate at will whenever and wherever we wanted 
to.”36  
Preventing Soviet control of the air was critical in the Mujahedeen’s attempt to 
seize the operational initiative. Early in the fighting, they were only able to obtain 
temporary tactical initiative but were unable to close with the enemy, or mass forces. The 
Soviets were able to exploit control of the air and move throughout the battlefield, 
synchronizing air and ground operations to limit Mujahedeen sanctuaries. Active air 	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defense changed that. The employment of the Stinger enabled the Mujahedeen to seize 
the initiative and fight the war on their own terms. By ending Soviet freedom of action, 
the Mujahedeen, who controlled the countryside, now had the advantage of depth and 
could concentrate their forces at critical points. With the air threat diminished, the 
Mujahedeen were able to increase and maintain their operational temp as well as 
establish a logistical structure that could support large-scale operations.37 
The Stinger removed the Soviet’s most flexible and effective fighting force, its air 
power and air assault forces, from the battlefield. In the first years of the war, the Soviets 
possessed the necessary agility to limit the initiative of Mujahedeen attacks. By 
desynchronizing the Soviet air-ground synergy, the Stinger eliminated the Soviet’s air 
component as an effective element of their combined arms team. It denied the Soviets 
their aerial fire support and their ability to resupply by air, thus reducing the Soviet 
operational capability.  
From another operational perspective, the Soviets were no longer able to use 
helicopter gun ships in a ground support role and the effectiveness of the Spetznaz was 
degraded as the insertion by helicopter became limited. As a result the Soviets increased 
their reliance on artillery and high-level aerial bombardment. As the war continued and 
civilian losses mounted, the resistance to the Soviets became stronger, more organized, 
and effective, demonstrating the duality of the surprise of the Stinger. With greater 
ramifications than the outcomes of specific engagements, the Fabian effect of the Stinger 
severely affected Soviet morale as well as global perceptions of the conflict. Declassified 
U.S. intelligence cables from March 1987 reveal the initially enormous perceived impact 
of the missiles. “The Stinger missile has changed the course of the war because Soviet 	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helicopter gunships and bombers no longer are able to operate as they once did.”  
According to such cables, more tactical and air support changes occurred in the last 
quarter of 1986 and the first quarter of 1987 than in the previous seven years of the 
conflict.38  
The Stinger directly struck at the Soviet military center of gravity, airpower, and 
demonstrated that control of the air environment was as vital in low-intensity conflict as 
in higher intensity warfare. In addition to the system’s ability to neutralize the major 
source of Soviet military strength and allow Mujahedeen to mass their forces for the 
conduct of large-scale operations, the Stinger was equally decisive in its psychological 
impact among Soviet and DRA pilots. The Stinger achieved a high level of respect 
among Afghan and Soviet pilots, who became increasingly unwilling to expose 
themselves or their aircraft to its lethal envelope. The accuracy and effectiveness of 
subsequent air operations suffered even more from the exaggerated belief in both the 
availability and capabilities of this missile among Soviet and DRA pilots. The 
Mujahedeen played on Soviet fears discussing their possession of Stinger missiles in 
radio communications, even if their group did not have the missile. The Soviets 
intercepted these communications and received an exaggerated picture of the availability 
of Stinger among the insurgent groups.39 The system became a symbol for not only the 
defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan but the victory for the West in the Cold War. This 
duality of effects is indicative of technological surprise.   
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In response to the Stinger's immediate success, the 40th Army initially restricted its pilots 
to less dangerous missions. The only reliable Soviet countermeasures employed were 
flying above 12,000 feet or at night.40 Both measures negated the tactical value of Soviet 
air power, and gave the Mujahedeen the freedom of movement they coveted. 
Fairly quickly, however, Soviet forces adopted a series of technical and tactical 
countermeasures that mitigated the impact of the Stinger. Technically, Soviet aircraft 
were retrofitted with improved flares, infrared beacons, and baffles on their exhausts to 
impede the Stinger’s ability to lock on target. Aircraft also were equipped with a missile 
radar warning system to notify pilots of the need for evasive action. 41 Tactically, the 
Soviets had numerous responses. Fixed-wing aircraft flew at higher altitudes outside the 
Stinger's three-mile range, which averted the missile threat but reduced the pilots’ 
effectiveness. Helicopter pilots pursued the opposite strategy, adopting low-altitude, and 
nap-of-the-earth techniques to hide from the Stingers. At the lower altitude, however, 
helicopters became more vulnerable to small-weapons fire. Interestingly, the same 
tactical countermeasures had been reported as early as the first year of the war and 
several times thereafter in response to earlier-model SAMs. However, the Stinger's 
introduction triggered a dramatic renewal and expansion of their use. Since the low 
altitude and nap-of-the-earth flight patterns were not designed for Hinds, their crews had 
not been properly trained for this tactic. This increased wear on airframes and systems, 
while greatly increasing rates of operational attrition.42 
Ultimately, the net effect of Soviet counter-measures was to offset the Stinger. 
Within 18 months of the Stinger introduction, USSR aircraft losses had dropped to 	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previous levels, indicating a successful adaptation. David Isby, an expert military analyst 
of the Afghan conflict, concluded in 1990 that, “although none of the Soviets’ 
countermeasures were totally successful, the Stinger did not succeed in forcing Soviet 
helicopters out of the sky.”43 The Soviets accepted the risk at lower altitudes and operated 
there throughout the rest of the war. They also sought to provide increased suppression of 
air defenses when attack helicopters conducted CAS missions. This capability was 
essentially limited during free hunt missions, and as result, hunt missions were drastically 
curtailed, especially in the border region where Stingers were known to be prevalent. 
New ground and air tactics as well as technical countermeasures eventually mitigated the 
Stinger threat. However, there can be little doubt that Hinds lost their freedom of 
movement, and as a result, a large degree of their effectiveness. A leading French expert 
on Afghanistan, Olivier Roy, confirmed from his experience among the rebels in late 
1988 that, “by 1989, the Stinger could no longer be considered a decisive anti-aircraft 
weapon.”44 
Yet the damage had already been done. As Scott McMichael states, “During the 
first two years of the war, the great majority of Soviet aircraft losses (75-80 percent) must 
be attributed to non-combat causes, plus losses suffered on the ground due to raids, rocket 
attacks, and sabotage… There can be no doubt at all that the Stinger turned the ratio on 
its head.”45 A rigorous U.S. Army analysis was conducted in early 1989 by a team sent to 
“go sit with the Mujahedin” in Pakistan for several weeks. It concluded that by war’s end 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 In Kuperman, The Stinger Missile, 251.  
44 Ibid, 249.  
45 McMichael, Scott R. Stumbling Bear: Soviet Military Performance in Afghanistan. London; 
Washington: Brassey’s, 1991: 92.  
   79	  
the rebels had scored approximately 269 kills in about 340 engagements with the Stinger, 
for a remarkable 79 percent kill ratio.46 
There was much debate as to the role of the Stinger on the Soviet withdrawal and 
defeat. It was reported in the American media that the supply of high-tech American 
weaponry to the Mujahedin played a key factor in the Soviet withdrawal from 
Afghanistan by convincing the Kremlin that the war was unwinnable.47 Conversely, it can 
be argued that the Stinger did not contribute to Soviet decision to leave the war but did 
deepen the demoralization of Soviet forces already facing the prospect of withdrawal. 
Two facts are clear. First, when Gorbachev came to power in 1985, he escalated the war. 
Second, had the United States not countered with the Stinger and other U.S. technology, 
the Soviets would have gained militarily against the Mujahedin.48 It is certain that the 
Stinger served to erode Soviet feelings of control. Therefore, while the Mujahedeen could 
not completely eliminate the most advanced aspect of Soviet force structure, its aerial 
presence, the Stinger succeeded in adjusting the power equation towards the Mujahedeen, 
while striking a material as well as symbolic blow to the Soviet war effort.  
 
Analysis  
The Mujahedeen recognized the tremendous importance of the Hind for Soviet 
operations, and effectively exploited the achievement of technological surprise via the 
Stinger SAM. Yet the Soviets responded to Stinger and in-theater developments as a 
whole, albeit ineffectively at first. In explaining this outcome, realist theory and the 	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strategic culture arguments prove most useful, while organizational theory and 
bureaucratic politics cannot offer explanations for Soviet action.  
The bureaucratic politics model, which this study defines as adaptation driven by 
individuals within a military bureaucracy, is unable to account for the decisive failure of 
Soviet adaptation. Due to the heavily centralized nature of the Soviet military, low-level 
commanders were driven by strict regulations and tactical norms dictating behavior in 
combat to a level of specificity uncommon in Western militaries. The result was a rigid 
method of warfare that left little to change or uncertainty.49 This precluded the Soviet 
ability to develop a degree of Western-style creativity and initiative in their junior 
leaders.  
The decentralized nature of the war in Afghanistan frequently forced decision-
making down to the level of field commanders. Bureaucratic politics predicts that men in 
these positions should act independently when required by the tactical situation. Yet their 
training required the strict adherence to higher unit commanders. As a result, field 
officers proved deficient in making independent decisions. Even with the Soviet desire to 
push the concept of Western-style initiative and creativity lower in their command 
structure, Soviet cultural reluctance to take risks and mixed signals from higher 
commanders hindered their success.50  
Traditionally, Soviet behavior is thought of as conforming to organizational 
theory. For organizational theorists, militaries resist change as a result of structural 
systems, norms, and standard operating procedures that together focus behavior toward 	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particular outcomes. Without a coherent design for promoting adaptation, an organization 
might find it impossible to learn and apply lessons to effectively accomplish mission 
objectives. Organization theory is ideal for explaining the actions of a Soviet-style 
military, but only during peacetime. Since it sees military organizations as highly 
resistant to change, it would predict that the Soviets would take no action in response to 
Mujahedeen threats. This was not the case, as the Soviets ultimately made changes to its 
theater-wide doctrine and operational concepts, as well as airmobile tactics following the 
deployment of the Stinger. Ultimately, an unsuccessful adaptation still compromises an 
attempt to adjust to battlefield realities, disproving the applicability of organizational 
theory to the Soviet case.  
Realist theory affords a plausible explanation for Soviet actions in adjusting their 
force to the Afghan theater. Soviet commanders were presented with clear incentives to 
change. One notable change was the definitive shift in the standard Soviet employment of 
airpower in the conduct of military operations. Soviet doctrine in 1979 had emphasized 
the use of airpower as a force adjunct for the direct support of ground forces. This 
doctrinal disposition relied heavily on the historical legacy of the Soviet experience 
against the Germans in WWII. In the initial period of the Afghan war, Soviet airpower 
conformed to this existing paradigm of ground support operations. However, the 
unwillingness of DRA forces to fight, Moscow’s reluctance to increase Soviet troop 
levels, and the desire to minimize casualties led to the employment of airpower as both a 
force multiplier and a force substitute in the battle against the Mujahedeen. This resulted 
in the increased use of helicopters and elite units to increase mobility and initiative, as 
well as a decrease in use of set-piece tactics that proved highly ineffective.  
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While realism correctly predicts the routine occurrence of change in Soviet 
actions as a result of combat encounters, it is Soviet strategic culture that explains the 
nature and characteristics of such adaptations. For example, despite a reevaluation of 
Soviet thinking as a result of field experience, there were few attempts at reform directed 
at the majority of Soviet forces. Rather, the attempt to allow for greater flexibility at the 
operational level produced piecemeal and isolated modification of airborne unit 
organization and employment. As stated by Mujahidin military commander Abdul Haq, 
“Since we were invaded nine years ago the Soviets have changed, step by step, their 
tactics. Soviets can change tactics but they cannot change their forces.”51 Although Soviet 
forces incrementally adapted at the tactical and operational level to the changing 
character of the war, they were unable to do so efficiently or effectively enough to defeat 
the resistance. The continued application of sequential conventional operations against a 
fragmented but skilled insurgent guerrilla force is a resounding indictment of Soviet 
strategic culture. 
 
Conclusion  
Throughout the decade of the 1970’s, U.S. perceptions of Soviet ground force tactics 
stressed a general lack of initiative and flexibility in their military doctrine. These 
assessments proved accurate after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Soviets were 
hindered by overconfidence in their military capabilities relative to the Mujahedeen and 
insecurities related to the Cold War environment. Their sustained prosecution of a limited 
war strategy against an adversary who approached the conflict as absolute was a failure, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Quoted in Westermann, The Limits of Soviet Airpower, 99.  
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while their inability to implement an effective counterinsurgency strategy against the 
Mujahedeen was telling.  
The Soviets’ rigidity in doctrine and strategy also contributed to their failure in 
Afghanistan. In the case of the Hind, Soviet attack helicopters faced numerous problems, 
both self-generated and enemy-induced. At the most basic level, the rigid nature of the 
Soviet system got in the way, causing pilots to blindly follow orders to attack unoccupied 
positions. The depth of this and similar problems is difficult to measure, but a lack of 
initiative is often cited with respect to Soviet military activity in general in Afghanistan. 
Along with the changes in helicopter doctrine at the onset of the war, this almost certainly 
created friction when it came to the planning and execution of attack helicopter 
missions.52 The Soviet failure demonstrates the potential danger in relying on airpower as 
a primary instrument for coercion. Soviet actions in Afghanistan showed that air 
supremacy does not constitute a panacea for guaranteeing success in contemporary 
military operations.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Groenke, “CAS, Interdiction, and Attack Helicopters,” 17.  
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Chapter 4 
The United States, IEDs, and Iraq      
 
This is an aspect of military science which needs to be studied above all 
others in the Armed Forces: the capacity to adapt oneself to the utterly 
unpredictable, the entirely unknown. I am tempted indeed to declare 
dogmatically that whatever doctrine the Armed Forces are working on 
now, they have got it wrong. I am also tempted to declare that it does not 
matter that they have got it wrong. What does matter is their capacity to 
get it right quickly when the moment arrives.1 
 
       Sir Michael Howard 	  	  
Introduction  
This chapter examines the strategic culture of the United States, which has received 
considerable attention given the well-documented history of American military 
engagements. The study of American strategic culture remains critical to strategic studies 
because even though the United States remains the world’s most powerful nation, she 
faces a future rife with uncertainty and unprecedented challenges from rising peer 
competitors seeking to alter the regional and international status quo. What follows is an 
examination of American strategic culture and its role in shaping the American response 
towards the technological surprise of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) encountered in 
Iraq. The experience of the United States with the IED is the empirical case study that 
most clearly demonstrates the role of strategic culture in influencing intra-war 
adaptations. This is not only because of the miniscule roles of organization theory and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Quoted in Lacquement, Jr., Richard. “In the Army Now.” The American Interest, September 1, 
2010. http://www.the-american-interest.com/articles/2010/09/01/in-the-army-now-2/.  
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bureaucratic politics in explaining American actions, but also because of the 
characteristics of the response; the nature of the counter-IED effort is explained by 
strategic culture but not realism. 
 
American Strategic Culture 
Today, there is perhaps no nation with a greater association between society and style of 
warfare than the United States. Scholars have studied this relationship by outlining the 
numerous characteristics of American methodology, addressing the distinction between a 
way of war and a way of battle, and illustrating the advantages and disadvantages of these 
characteristics in major conflicts and small wars. Within this historiography, authors have 
also tried to define the characteristics of the strategic American way of war, including 
advancing American national interests through various means, and how culture and 
preparation for war actually shape American strategy.  
Historian Russell Weigley was the first to define the American approach to 
conflict and popularize the phrase “the American way of war.” According to Weigley, 
since the American Civil War the U.S. armed forces have pursued a unique approach to 
combat favoring wars of annihilation through the generous use of firepower. The U.S. 
military has viewed “the complete overthrow of the enemy, the destruction of his military 
power, [as] the object of war.”2 The strategy of attrition is manifested by the methods 
employed by Ulysses S. Grant to defeat Robert E. Lee’s forces during the Civil War, by 
John J. Pershing against the Germans in WWI, and by the U.S. Army Air Force against 
German and Japanese cities during WWII. In this view, the Civil War, WWI, and WWII 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Weigley, Russell. The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and 
Policy. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1977: xxi.  
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were won not by tactical or strategic brilliance but by the weight of numbers as well as 
the destructive power that a fully mobilized and highly industrialized democracy can 
bring to bear.  
Military historian Max Boot offers a critique of Weigley’s interpretation of 
American military history by maintaining that America has more than one way of war. 
Boot analyzes American involvement in “small wars” such as the Boxer Rebellion, the 
Philippine-American War, and the late 20th century interventions Bosnia and Kosovo. 
These small wars were fought not to attain decisive victory over an opponent, but for 
reasons related to inflicting punishment, ensuring protection, achieving pacification, and 
benefiting from profiteering. According to Boot, these involvements outnumber 
American participation in major conflicts and are, therefore, deserving of inclusion in any 
description of the American style of war.3  
While the viewpoints of Weigley and Boot appear contradictory, the synthesis of 
the two arguments presents a complete description of American force deployments 
covering the spectrum of conventional operations. They are therefore complementary, as 
U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Antulio Echevarria argues. He writes that in both 
arguments, the American way of war tends to avoid turning military triumphs, whether 
major campaigns or small-unit actions, into strategic successes.4 Ultimately, both the 
Weigley and Boot interpretations implicitly portray the American way of war as a way of 
battle more than a way of war.5 In other words, the American concept of war has rarely 
extended beyond the winning of battles and campaigns to the difficult work of turning 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Boot, Max. The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power. New 
York: Basic Books, 2002. 
4 Echevarria II, LTC Antulio. Towards an American Way of War. Op-Ed. U.S. Army War 
College, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, March 2004. 
5 Echevarria, Towards an American Way of War, 2004.  
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military victory into strategic success. Consequently, the American way of war is more a 
way of battle than a way of war. 
Within this way of battle, American officials have typically viewed an opponent’s 
center of gravity as his military force, the destruction of which marks the end of war and 
the achievement of victory. This a-political and a-strategic way of war emphasizes the 
pursuit of tactical victory as the end state autonomous from strategic policy, rather than 
as the beginning of post-war negotiations and a means to a political resolution. 6 War 
represents an alternative to bargaining, rather than the Clausewitzian view of combat as 
part of an ongoing bargaining process. For example, the quick U.S. tactical victory in Iraq 
in 2003 did not immediately lead to peace and stability in Iraq because the American 
pursuit of a quick victory occurred, as it often does, independent of strategic policy 
decisions.  
Thus, the American way of battle is characterized by an aggressive style of force 
to overwhelm and destroy enemy forces in order to acquire a decisive victory with 
minimal casualties. Its hallmarks are speed, maneuver, flexibility, and surprise. By 
combining the superiority of information with the use of information-enabled weapon 
systems trained against enemy centers of gravity, the aim of U.S. military strategy is to 
deliver a shock effect against opposing armed forces in the context of regular warfare. 
Doing so neutralizes the adversary’s command and control. In addition, it strives to 
integrate naval, air, and land power into a seamless whole. These characteristics of the 
American tactical and operational way of battle are advantageous in large-scale, force on 
force conflicts.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Gray, Colin. Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War 
Adapt. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2006. 
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Accordingly, the American approach to irregular warfare is not very different 
from approach to conventional conflict; small or irregular wars have typically been 
viewed as conventional wars but on a smaller scale. At the operational level of irregular 
warfare, the military seeks to exploit and disrupt enemy centers of gravity even where 
they may not exist in the same sense as conventional combat. In addition, the same 
techno-centric approach applied to regular operations is applied here. The procedures of 
irregular warfare are defined by precision targeting coupled with high operational tempo, 
as American forces seek to create conditions for the rapid lockout of adversary courses of 
action. However, when niche science and technology efforts are tailored for irregular 
warfare, they often are isolated from the broader force development process.  
Most critically in the context of irregular operations, American forces have 
demonstrated a stark under-appreciation for historical lessons and cultural differences 
within the theater of operations. The lack of cultural and historical curiosity frequently 
results in a situation in which the enemy understands American forces more coherently 
and effectively than the Americans understand him.7 This outcome may be a result of the 
distance between the American homeland and the nation’s overseas contingency 
operations, or overconfidence in enemy inferiority. On the other hand, countries like 
Israel, India, and South Korea actively seek to maximize their knowledge of potential 
adversaries by following Sun Tzu’s precept of knowing one’s enemy, especially since 
threats to their respective national securities predominately emanate from just outside of 
their national borders.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 See the Sunni insurgency in Iraq and the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan of the past decade. 
Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation, 82.  
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No nation in recent history has placed greater emphasis upon the role of 
technology in planning and waging war than the United States. For example, the 
emphasis on precision firepower is innate to the wider tendency of American society to 
place faith in the ability of science and technology to solve the problems of war and 
protect precious manpower. As a result, one the most defining characteristic of the 
American way of war is its emphasis on technology. The American industrial approach to 
warfare, increasing emphasis on minimal casualties, and pursuit of victory through 
annihilation by firepower makes the United States one of the most techno-centric 
militaries in world. The U.S. strategic approach is increasingly driven by the notion that 
future warfare will be highly technological, and that America will maintain her strategic 
position only by transforming her fighting forces ahead of her competitors. 
The American fascination with technology dictates, drives, and organizes the 
managerial mind set in U.S. military affairs. WWII witnessed the wholesale mobilization 
of American science and technology, culminating in the detonation of the atomic bomb. 
Technology played an important role in America’s conduct of the Cold War as well, as 
the United States sought to use its qualitative advantage to counterbalance the numerical 
superiority of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.  
The American emphasis on technology also reflects the preference in American 
military for simplicity over complexity.8 In other words, a reliance on technology is a 
corollary of the predisposition to solve problems as quickly and simply as possible. It 
also reflects how the American way of war tends to avoid turning military strength into 
strategic successes by seeking refuge from difficult problems of strategy in technology. 
For example, this chapter’s discussion of the American response to the IED will 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Ibid, 85. 
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demonstrate how the reliance on technology that preserved manpower and tactical 
initiative also served to isolate coalition troops from the Iraqi populace, contradicting the 
strategic principles of population-centric counterinsurgency.     
The traditional orientation towards quick action and results, an attachment to 
things new and futuristic, and a disinclination to wage a long war has resulted in “an 
almost instinctive reliance of American strategists on technology as a panacea in national 
security affairs.”9 In a pervasive atmosphere of technological determinism, the functional 
and practical application of technology should be designed to address specific 
requirements related to a narrow set of operational or tactical threats, rather than as a 
substitute for strategic thinking.10 For example, the United States failed to accomplish 
strategic objectives in Vietnam despite enjoying a considerable technological edge over 
its adversaries because it failed to develop an adequate strategy to achieve its political 
objectives.11 During the 1990s, the U.S. government increasingly looked to technology in 
the form of standoff air- and sea-launched precision-guided munitions to solve problems 
related to terrorism and ethnic violence, even though the issues were at their root 
political. Washington’s penchant for advanced technology also fostered the illusion 
among some that the United States could use force without killing American soldiers and 
innocent civilians, and among America’s enemies that the United States was averse to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Ibid, 91.  
10 Ibid, 131.  
11 See Collins, John. “Vietnam Postmortem: A Senseless Strategy.” Parameters, U.S. Army War 
College 40, no. 4 (March 2010): 32; “American strategists struck out in Vietnam. Our forces won 
every battle, but this country lost the war… It had little to do with disciplinary problems that 
deviled American troops during the later stages. It had little to do with constraints on U.S. air 
power or privileged sanctuaries. It had little to do with outside logistic support for our 
opposition… The cause was a senseless strategy that foiled us for 14 straight years.”  
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sustaining casualties.12 Ultimately, while prudent and innovative exploitation of the 
technological dimension to strategy and war is a vital asset, technology that dictates 
tactics regardless of the political context can be detrimental to strategic aims.  
 
Iraq  
The U.S. military is an institution best prepared for combat against a symmetrical and 
regular enemy rather than an asymmetrical one. In other words, America’s military 
institutions were designed to fight peer competitors or the armed forces of other states 
and not transnational terrorist organizations or insurgencies. The U.S. method of fighting 
and victory in WWII is preferable to the U.S. method of counterinsurgency in 
Afghanistan. Thus U.S. forces were not culturally, ideationally, or materially equipped to 
deal with the asymmetric threats experienced during the war on terrorism.  
The United States invaded Iraq in 2003 boasting the world’s best-equipped 
military. Using a host of technologies and weapons that had been integrated into its force 
structure starting in the early 1990s, the invading force made quick work of Iraqi forces. 
American forces applied a new generation of sensors, precision guided munitions, and 
advanced command and control systems to great effect against a notably inferior enemy. 
U.S. armed forces specialize in network-centric warfare, taking advantage of information 
technology to radically enhance the effectiveness of C4ISR: command, control, 
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Thus the 
invasion seemed to confirm the primacy of U.S. global military power. However, 
optimism regarding the success of shock and awe offensive operations soon dissipated as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Mahnken, Thomas. United States Strategic Culture. Comparative Strategic Cultures 
Curriculum. Advanced Systems and Concepts Office: Defense Threat Reduction Agency, 
November 13, 2006: 12.  
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the U.S. became embroiled in insurgencies and civil war in Iraq. This was a kind of 
warfare that the U.S. had failed to prepare for, and had not directly experienced since the 
Vietnam War. The military came to the understanding that the methods and technology 
for defeating Saddam’s conventional forces and bases of operation would not prove as 
effective against irregular insurgent groups. The U.S. had to adapt or face defeat, as it 
became clear that a lack of credence was given to the possibility of enemy technological 
surprise. 
 
The IED Surprise  
Soon after the conclusion of conventional operations, the U.S. military found itself 
increasingly confronted by irregular forces employing unconventional tactics in largely 
urban settings. Unable to match the U.S. in conventional firepower, insurgents initially 
resorted to ambush tactics and the sporadic use of indirect fires. Insurgent forces soon 
shifted their tactics to emphasize the use of IEDs as well as vehicle-borne IEDs 
(VBIEDs). The IED threat that emerged in Iraq and later Afghanistan is one of the few 
contemporary examples of a conventional military confronting a tactical surprise with 
operational if not strategic implications, necessitating adaptation at all levels to avoid 
strategic defeat. 
Joint U.S. military doctrine defines an IED as a weapon that is fabricated or 
emplaced in an unconventional manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, 
pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals designed to kill, destroy, incapacitate, harass, deny 
mobility, or distract.13 IEDs may incorporate military munitions and hardware, but are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Operations. Joint Publication 3-15.1, Department of 
Defense Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C, January 9, 2012: vii.  
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generally constructed from components that are nonmilitary in nature. The weapon comes 
in many shapes and sizes, and are often classified by their method of employment, either 
suicide or non-suicide. Despite the many variations, IEDs usually share several common 
components: a main charge utilizing high-yield explosives such as C4 or TNT, or low-
yield explosives such as black powder or fertilizer; a power source such as batteries, 
alternating current, or recoiled springs; a command-, time-, or victim-operated switch; an 
initiator, such as electric or non-electric blasting caps; and a container which may be a 
vehicle, shell casing, pipe, plastic jug, or even an animal carcass. Some IEDs additionally 
contain enhancements such as fuel, fragmentation, or contamination hazards.14  
While the IED is sometimes described as a new technology, it actually has a 
lengthy history; ships loaded with explosives were used as far back as the 1500s, while 
various jury-rigged bombs and mines were used in the American Civil War including the 
naval battle of Mobile Bay and the land battle of Petersburg.15 Even the more 
contemporary versions of IEDs, whose explosively formed penetrators can pierce even 
the armor plating of the U.S. military’s mine-resistant vehicles, actually date back to 
WWI.  
Facing the prospect of defeat against a numerically, militarily, or industrially 
superior opponent, the use of IEDs by relatively inferior forces should come as no 
surprise. From the perspective of the outnumbered, outgunned, and ill-equipped, the 
decision to employ IEDs is logical because they are cheap, flexible, and highly effective 
weapons. They can provide a pragmatic insurgent with a weapon capable of striking a 	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15 Hearn, Chester G. Mobile Bay and the Mobile Campaign: The Last Great Battles of the Civil 
War. Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1993. Pages 32-37; Singer, Peter. “The Evolution of Improvised 
Explosive Devices (IEDs).” Brookings Institute. Armed Forces Journal, Feb. 2012. 
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punishing blow against a superior enemy while also avoiding the enemy’s combat 
advantages. It is the combination of two factors- its cost effectiveness and its’ potential to 
produce strategic and operational effects, that have defined the use of the IED against 
U.S. forces in Iraq. The IED is cheap and simple, relatively easy to deploy, and most 
importantly, it is symbolically powerful. It has allowed insurgents to frustrate a militarily 
superior force, while using mass media to erode support for the conflict at home. Like 
many weapons that retain their utility over time, the IED is extremely functional. It is 
extremely versatile and can be used in a virtually unlimited number of ways to achieve an 
endless variety of goals. Due to its improvised nature it can take any number of forms, 
the only limitation being the imagination of the “bomb maker.”16 
The complex urban terrain of Iraq provided ample concealment for such attacks, 
while IEDs provided an ideal means to attrite U.S. forces on patrol at very little risk to 
the insurgents. For the period March 2003 to early August 2007, 1,496 of a total 3,037 
coalition deaths due to hostile causes (49.5%) were attributed to IEDs. From January 
2005 to early August 2007, the percentage increased to 65%. From March 2007 onward, 
the percentage of hostile deaths attributed to IED attacks continued to rise to 72%.17 
Stated another way, for the conflict as a whole, from March 2003 to August 2007, IEDs 
accounted for almost half of all coalition deaths due to hostile causes.  
A typical tactical platform such as a tank or artillery serves as a weapon that 
causes physical damage as an end in itself. A tactical weapon contributes to the tactical 
success when it creates low-level, discrete effects on specific systems. The IED differs in 	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that the physical damage generated by the IED is only a fraction of its utility. It may be 
used simply in a tactical manner, but its greatest utility lies with its symbolic qualities and 
the potential for strategic influence. Delivered in a non-linear fashion through both social 
and physical space, its functionality is the destruction that it is able to cause both 
physically and psychologically on two separate targets: the target of attack and the target 
of influence.  
The lethality of the IED was most poignantly manifested in the damage done to 
the most heavily armored U.S. vehicle, the M-1 Abrams tank. Some IEDs were large 
enough to penetrate virtually any thickness of armor, using technology like explosively 
formed projectiles and shape charges with assistance from Iran. For example, on July 23, 
2005, a 500-pound bomb detonated underneath a Humvee in Baghdad, killing all four 
passengers and leaving a crater six feet deep and seventeen feet wide. A few weeks later, 
another IED flipped a 25-ton amphibious assault vehicle, killing all fourteen marines 
inside. Compared to the first Gulf War during which 18 M-1s were disabled but no 
casualties suffered, between March 2003 and March 2005, 80 tanks were badly damaged 
as a result of IEDs.18 
As the Iraq War demonstrates, an adversary may employ IEDs to achieve effects 
at all levels of war. At the tactical level, these devices were often used as obstacles and 
barriers to maneuver, similar to the way that a conventional combatant would employ 
mines. The Joint Chiefs define an obstacle as “any obstruction designed or employed to 
disrupt, fix, turn, or block the movement of an opposing force,” while also posing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Mahnken, Thomas G. Technology and the American Way of War. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2008: 213-215.  
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potential increased losses in personnel, time, and equipment on the opposing force.19 In 
short a barrier is nothing more than a coordinated series of obstacles employed to achieve 
a specific effect on the opposing force.  
The successful employment of IEDs as a means of attacking ground forces 
created the effects traditionally associated with obstacles and barriers. Insurgents began 
to restrict the freedom of movement of coalition forces into certain areas or along certain 
routes, and canalizing forces into engagement areas for ambush attacks. Blocking access 
to stretches of urban terrain made it possible for insurgents to develop strongholds, where 
they controlled both the terrain and the population. Deliberately planned belts of IEDs 
raised the cost of defeating the obstacles to an unacceptable level. Without extensive 
combat engineering and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) resources, the Joint Force 
would risk extensive casualties and destruction of equipment in breaching operations. 
Eventually, some enclaves such as Sadr City in Baghdad were left virtually unpatrolled, 
as they had essentially become restrictive terrain for the coalition.20 
At the operational level, the employment of IEDs along ground lines of 
communication (LOCs) served to effectively disrupt coalition operations. In Iraq, long 
supply lines originating in Kuwait challenged coalition forces. As the insurgency grew, 
these LOCs were highly vulnerable and presented rewarding soft targets for attack. The 
threat these devices posed to the sustainment of forces in the field required the 
operational commander to dedicate significant combat power and intelligence, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism. Joint 
Publication 3-07.2, Washington, DC: CJCS, 1998: GL-3. 
20 Brobeck, Maj. Brian. Protection, Risk and Communication: Battling the Effects of Improvised 
Explosive Devices in Contemporary Operations. Newport, RI: Joint Military Operations 
Department, Naval War College, May 4, 2010: 7.  
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surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) resources to protecting these vital LOCs. In 
addition to the logistical difficulties, the apportionment of forces along key LOCs limited 
tactical commanders’ offensive options due to a reduced ability to mass combat power. 
The effective deployment of IEDs has its greatest impact at the strategic level 
because such attacks indirectly struck at the strategic center of gravity. In the information 
age, public opinion is influential and may therefore be a priority target for a militarily 
overmatched adversary. Coupled with the reach of modern information systems and 
public media, IED attacks produce second and third order affects that transformed this 
local battlefield weapon into weapons of mass strategic effect. Iraqi insurgents accurately 
recognized the will of the American people as the American strategic center of gravity, 
and used two specific methods to employ IEDs in order to achieve strategic effects. First, 
targeting of coalition forces and inflicting casualties effectively raised the cost of the 
conflict by eroding public and political support back home. Second, the targeting of 
civilians served to spur unrest and prompt sectarian retaliation, which discredited 
coalition efforts at establishing security and maintaining order.21 Both of these lines of 
effort relied on global information flow and media stories that depicted the scenes, 
stories, and images the insurgents desired to portray. 
 
Response  
The initial coalition reaction to the IED threat from 2004-2006 ultimately served to 
magnify the weapon’s influence.22 Forces responded to the threat of being bombed while 
out on patrol by increasing protective armor on vehicles and personnel, establishing a few 	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22 Brobeck, Protection, Risk and Communication, 8.  
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primary patrol and logistics routes, and operating from scores of large forward operating 
bases. These actions served to effectively isolate ground forces from the Iraqi people 
while leaving significant portions of terrain open for the enemy to occupy. “The IED is 
the enemy’s artillery system,” According to U.S. General Montgomery Meigs, in 2007. 
“What’s different is the trajectory. Three 152mm rounds underneath a tank, which will 
blow a hole in it, are artillery rounds. But they didn’t come through three-dimensional 
space in a parabolic trajectory. They came through a social trajectory and a social 
network in the community,” affecting the enemy far beyond the battlefield.23 Officials 
were quickly learning that IEDs were the product of human ingenuity and human social 
organization, and as a result had to be understood in the social context in which they were 
built and employed. As one member of the Office of Naval Research wrote in 2005:  
“A shift in focus from IED technology to IED makers requires examining 
the social environment in which bombs are invented, manufactured, 
distributed, and used. Focusing on the bomb maker requires understanding 
the four elements that make IED use possible in Iraq: knowledge, 
organization, material, and the surrounding population.”24 
 
The initial impact of the IED attacks was compounded by ill-conceived American 
operational and strategic thinking, which failed to adequately consider the psychological 
impact on the local Iraqi populace and American public opinion. 
The situation surrounding the IED and the American response began to gather 
momentum with the broader shift to a counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq starting in late 
2006. The strategic realignment corresponded with several broader adaptations 
specifically designed to overcome the IED. The evidence suggests that the emergence of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Atkinson, Rick. “‘The Single Most Effective Weapon against Our Deployed Forces’” The 
Washington Post, 30 Sept. 2007. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/09/29/AR2007092900750.html?hpid=topnews.  
24 McFate, Montgomery. “Iraq: The Social Context of IEDs.” Military Review 85, no. 3 (June 
2005): 37. 
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the IED threat in Iraq was a dangerous surprise for the U.S. military, necessitating a 
response of national proportions with military, industrial, scientific, and budgetary 
dimensions. Further, the need to make significant acquisitions of new equipment, much 
of it not previously held in U.S. inventories, supports the contention that American forces 
were surprised by the emergence of the IED threat. The response by U.S. commanders is 
also indicative of American strategic culture and the predilection for technological 
acquisitions in the protection of warfighters. For example, the massive cold-start 
acquisition program to equip U.S. forces with the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected 
(MRAP) vehicle conformed to the American preference for technological systems to 
meet unforeseen threats. 
In February 2006, a Department of Defense Directive established the Joint IED 
Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) with the mission to lead all Department of Defense 
actions in support of the Combatant Commanders’ and their respective Joint Task Forces’ 
efforts to defeat IEDs. The precise mission of the organization was to defeat the device, 
attack IED networks, and train the force to deal with countering the weapon system. 
JIEDDO was mandated to lead, advocate, and coordinate counter-IED initiatives by 
operating in conjunction with various national laboratories, the Department of Energy, 
academia, the defense industry, and other services and agencies on technologies and 
countermeasures to the IED threat. Through JIEDDO, the United States spent billions of 
dollars to develop technologies to detect IEDs, focusing extensively on developing high-
tech solutions to defeating the improvised device.25 Consistent with American strategic 
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culture, technology was always at the forefront of JIEDDO initiatives and a significant 
emphasis on technology supported almost all approaches to the problem. 
One of the first adaptation efforts was to increase personnel survivability against 
IED effects for soft-skinned general purpose vehicles, in which the majority of movement 
was undertaken and which are essential for the efficient conduct of routine functions such 
as personnel transportation, administrative movement, and logistic resupply. Initially, 
U.S. forces in Iraq had few general-purpose vehicles with armored protection and even 
fewer vehicles that were optimized for the conduct of counter-IED (CIED) activities. 
Even when armored, however, the protection offered by Humvees was inadequate and a 
need for a better-protected vehicle was soon identified. 
As a result, great investments were made in defensive technologies like the 
MRAP. The MRAP was viewed as part of a larger military contest between U.S. armored 
vehicles and Iraqi insurgents: armor vs. anti-armor competition. The MRAP is a large, 
heavily armored vehicle, originally designed and fielded for mine clearing and explosive 
ordnance disposal tasks. The basic vehicle design incorporates very heavy armor 
arranged in a v-shaped hull that deflects the blast away from the passenger compartment. 
A heavy-duty, raised chassis and the use of tires instead of tracks help to create space for 
dissipating the blast energy from a mine-like explosion. The sheer mass of the vehicle 
also provides an increased level of protection. MRAP design characteristics have also 
been incorporated into smaller armored vehicles to better protect military personnel from 
the hazards of blast and shrapnel.26 However, it is clear based on insurgent reactions to 
the MRAP that they anticipated the American technological response and were able to 
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quickly adapt the IED to it. As American armor increased in effectiveness, the amount of 
explosives used in each IED increased.  
Another American technological adaptation was intended to prevent the 
detonation of the devices by jamming or denying the radio frequencies (RF) used to 
transmit signals between initiating systems and the devices themselves. The 
implementation of spectrum denial and jamming systems known collectively as CREW 
(counter radio-controlled electronic warfare), was intended to defeat many of the radio-
controlled devices that were prevalent in the theater.27 Jammers were installed in vehicles 
in an attempt to defeat the RF triggering devices.  
The insurgent response to the first deployment of battlefield jammers was swift. 
Insurgents resorted to using command wires and pressure wire as triggering mechanisms. 
Command wires are a pair of insulated copper wires, which connect the triggering device 
to the blasting cap and can be several kilometers long. Pressure wire is a victim-operated 
trigger that it initiates when someone steps on it or a vehicle runs over it.28 As a result, 
despite possessing RF jamming equipment on their vehicles developed specifically to 
mitigate the risk and potential casualties, coalition forces continued to suffer the 
devastating effects of IEDs. 
As it became clear that ad-hoc technical solutions would not eliminate the IED, a 
second approach was developed that recognized that the IED required a nuanced whole-
of-government approach to get as far “left of the boom” as possible. A method was 
sought to defeat the device prior to detonation rather than to mitigate the effectiveness of 
the blast. As part of defeating the device prior to its deployment, the JIEDDO mandate to 	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attack the IED network was arguably its most effective line of this new approach. 
According to former JIEDDO Director Lt. Gen. Thomas F. Metz, “Attack the Network is 
one of the biggest areas where JIEDDO has made progress. I’m convinced that defeating 
IEDs requires attacking the devices at their source. By targeting the networks that fund 
and build IEDs, we can attack the enemy before they take action.”29 
As part of this line of operation, JIEDDO established its Counter-IED Operations 
Integration Center (COIC) with the task of combining multi-source intelligence with 
analytical technologies to create a common operational and intelligence picture of IED 
systems.30 The insurgent operators in Iraq (as well as Afghanistan) were supported by 
organized networks that financed operations by supplying critical elements for the 
production of IEDs, creating the devices, and planning and executing attacks. The new 
COIC system implemented powerful analytics to gain critical, data driven insight into the 
structure, character, interactions, and methods associated with those networks. By 
analyzing data from a myriad of sources, JIEDDO staffers attempted to identify and 
analyze the linkages between individuals and groups that indicated a support network. 
Through the synthesis of vast amounts of signals and human intelligence, the COIC 
created a detailed operational picture in support of offensive operations against IED 
networks. The COIC also served as a conduit for strategic feedback and collaborative 
analysis. Within the COIC, JIEDDO also formed the Law Enforcement Professional 
program to leverage the knowledge and skill of former law enforcement experts to attack 
the IED network activities. It enabled the services to disrupt the vast network by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Smith, Irene, and Michael Coderre. “The Continuing War Against Improvised Explosive 
Devices.” WSTIAC (Weapons Systems Technology Information Analysis Center) Quarterly 8, no. 
2 (2008): 3–6. 
30 Ibid.  
   103	  
expanding operations beyond emplaces and target the finances, explosives, suppliers, and 
the planners that constructed IEDs.31 
Within the operational context of the final JIEDDO mandate, training the force, 
commanders focused on developing a better understanding of enemy tactics, techniques, 
and procedures (TTPs) involving their employment of IEDs. This was executed with an 
eye toward modifying and improving U.S. TTPs to counter enemy adaptations. This 
effort was reinforced at the operational level by adapting an existing structure that was 
already available to the counter-IED effort. This involved expanding the Mine and 
Explosive Ordnance Information Coordination Center (MEOICC) from an organization 
concerned mainly with traditional explosive hazards such as landmines and unexploded 
ordinance, to one focused on IEDs.32  
As such, the solution to the IED was not just military but leveraged technological 
advances as well. Ground commanders began making significant efforts to counter the 
enemy networks that were required to build, deploy, and employ IEDs. Early on, these 
efforts were largely focused on finding and destroying caches of weapons material and a 
kinetic action against the IED triggermen. As the threat from IEDs increased, tactical 
commanders applied increasing resources and emphasis toward this effort. Intelligence 
and forensic analysis, surveillance and targeting of IED network members and programs 
offering rewards to citizens who would identify the location of IEDs or weapons caches 
all leveraged in an attempt to disrupt the enemy IED campaign.33 Airlift transports to 
reduce the number of U.S. supply convoys leveraged U.S. air supremacy and America’s 	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asymmetric advantage in aerial capabilities. These efforts and others attempted to ensure 
that forces operating in Iraq and those preparing to deploy were well prepared to deal 
with the IED threat. 
 
Analysis 
Realist theory correctly predicts the occurrence of change as a result of the identification 
of the IED threat. However it is the characteristics or nature of the response, the belief 
that technology would enable forces to cope with irregular challenges at relatively low 
costs, which is explained by strategic culture. During the near decade long engagement in 
Iraq, the Pentagon waged the battle against IEDs in the classic American style: by 
spending billions and using advanced technology. “Congress is real good shoveling 
money to defense contractors,” said G.I. Wilson, a retired Marine colonel and military 
commentator. “There is a fixation with the technological fix for everything.”34 This 
conforms to the techno-centric strategic culture of American forces through the industrial 
approach to warfare desire for minimal casualties, and pursuit of victory. Also supporting 
the strategic culture explanation is the role of the MRAP not only in protecting troops, 
but facilitating the annihilation of the enemy by firepower via speed, maneuver, and 
flexibility. Strategic culture also explains the lack of preparation for irregular conflict, as 
well as the application of conventional systems and tactics to non-linear operations.  
While the innovative exploitation of technology has served as a vital asset in 
contributing to American military power, a strategic culture in which technology dictates 	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tactics regardless of the context can be detrimental to multiple levels of objectives. 
Though the technological adjustments made by the force served to lessen the IED threat 
and protect troops in the field, these measures alone did not prove decisive in the conflict. 
Most importantly, IED countermeasures failed for the most part to positively change two 
of the most important IED metrics: IED detection rate and rate of incidents that injure or 
kill coalition forces. Since technological countermeasures are inherently reactive, they 
only served to mitigate the threat, not defeat it completely. Thus, the technological efforts 
did not significantly improve the ability of forces to detect IEDs prior to detonation, 
eliminating technology as the panacea American planners hoped it would be.  
Supporting the explanation of strategic culture is the formation of an entirely new 
organization to address the IED threat, JIEDDO. This serves as evidence against 
organizational theory of a change, which would predict no change in American actions 
after encountering the IED. However, the unique composition of the organization brought 
together experts from various fields and professions, affording JIEDDO a degree of 
flexibility and outside the box thinking. This runs counter to organizational theory’s 
prescription for highly rigid institutions with limited opportunities for adaptation. Rather, 
the perceived inflexibility or cognitive constraints on the part of JIEDDO emanated from 
American strategic culture. This is demonstrated by the overwhelming technical nature of 
JIEDDO’s work, not only in the operational line of defeating the device, but in attacking 
the network and training the force as well. This substantiates the claim that organizational 
actions are dictated or informed by strategic culture. The creation of JIEDDO also does 
not conform to bureaucratic politics theory because the counter-IED effort was a defense-
wide movement rather than the product of a few maverick officers and defense officials. 
   106	  
Bureaucratic politics does not play a significant role in interpreting the response 
to the IED, especially due to the advanced command and control capabilities of the 
American military. For example, the first forward-deployed troops that encountered the 
devices up-armored their vehicles with “hillbilly armor” and spare parts. These combat 
commanders were the first to realize the need for greater defensive mechanisms and 
protection to mitigate the effectiveness of IEDs. However, the actions of these combat 
commanders cannot be classified as part of bureaucratic political theory. Rather, their 
aggregate combat experiences and subsequent messages up the chain of command 
represent feedback in the combat operations process. This feedback was routine, and 
essential to the adjustment of battlefield indicators and measures of effectiveness. Thus 
makeshift armor, other tactical adjustments, and reporting did not represent maverick-
type activities but rather standard operating procedures.  
 
 Conclusion 
So much more than just roadside bombs, IEDs became the signature enemy weapon 
system in the Iraq war narrative. Insurgents used IEDs to great effect against the U.S.-led 
coalition, disrupting tactical operations, restricting freedom of action, inflicting 
considerable numbers of casualties, and psychologically impacting moral. These effects 
presented the most significant threat to the success of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF): the 
loss of domestic support. U.S. military officials report that great progress has been made 
defeating IEDs. Yet even after a decade of war in Iraq and Afghanistan costing more than 
$1 trillion, U.S. troops continue to feel the presence of a weapon that can be assembled 
with parts costing less than thirty dollars.  
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As long as the United States maintains its significant margin of superiority in 
conventional military capabilities, future contingency operations will likely continue to 
place the Joint Force in confrontation with militarily inferior adversaries. If the Iraq 
experience is used as an indicator of future trends, these adversaries will remain highly 
adaptive and capable of applying the limited means available to them to successfully 
attack American interests.35 This applies not only to non-state actors like militant or 
insurgent groups, but state actors as well. This includes ascendant state powers that desire 
resources and status, and are posturing to contest U.S. hegemony. These adaptive 
competitors are also translating lessons from recent conflicts into new concepts, 
capabilities, and doctrines tailored to counter traditional U.S. strengths while exploiting 
vulnerabilities. Consequently, the United States and its allies face an unprecedentedly 
varied array of threats, ranging from existential to potentially crippling systems. 
It is easy to suggest that the U.S. military needs to be more adaptive and 
imaginative in confronting future threats, but this realization faces extraordinary 
difficulties due to the involvement of military culture; “Cultural change in large 
organizations represents an effort akin to altering the course of an aircraft carrier.”36 Thus 
the challenge of adaptation proves even more daunting in the contemporary and future 
security environment considering the pace of technological advancement, the diffusion of 
political and military power, and the difficulty in intelligence analysis of meta-data. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion           
 
Because of the growing complexity of weapon systems... and difficulties 
in disseminating this information, the potential for a technological failure 
and technological surprise not only lurks in the shadow but also becomes 
larger with time.1  
   
Azriel Lorber  
 
How to make sensible adaptations in a world dominated by chance, 
harrow, misperceptions, and human frailty is the hard question that 
military institutions, no matter how sophisticated their technology, will 
confront far into the future.2	  
                                                                                  	  
    Williamson Murray	  
 
Introduction  
Throughout history, nations have been confronted by unexpected threats that place them 
at a critical military disadvantage. These situations are an extension of the more general 
notion of military surprise, often achieved through the innovative application of 
technology, or a change in tactics or behavior. With globalization, the phenomenon of 
technological surprise, which this study has addressed as the intervening variable in the 
process of intra-war adaptation, is especially threatening as it increasingly functions 
across tactical, operational, and strategic levels. This development reflects the idea that 
while the nature of war is fairly constant; its characteristics are constantly evolving.  
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Surprise and a successful response constitute a cycle that begins when the surprise 
emerges, putting the surprised force at a disadvantage by negating some aspect of its 
capability. The cycle continues as the surprised force responds; if it does so successfully, 
it nullifies the disadvantage and regains its capability.3 Nations and their military 
establishments have shown differing levels of agility in responding to battlefield 
surprises. Before a force can respond, however, it must recognize that it has been 
surprised; it must understand that familiar capabilities and accustomed reactions may not 
result in success. With that realization, an institution can begin to address the challenges 
of deciding how to organize and execute a response.  
One of Williamson Murray’s conclusions from his notable work on military 
innovation is that factors that drive successful innovation in peacetime are similar to 
those that drive successful adaptation in war. Both require imagination and a willingness 
to change. Both involve the awareness of the possibilities and potential for change. And 
both demand cultures that encourage the upward flow of ideas and perceptions, as well as 
direction from above. Particularly important is the need for senior leaders to encourage 
their staff and for subordinates to seek out new paths.4 While these qualities are not 
disputed, they are simply the processes of larger theories of change that I have outlined in 
this study.  
There are substantial differences in the theories that govern inter-war innovation 
and intra-war adaptation. In peacetime, time, fog, and friction pose few significant 
challenges to the innovator. This affords realism, bureaucratic politics, and organizational 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Smith, Andrew. Improvised Explosive Devices in Iraq, 2003-09: A Case of Operational 
Surprise and Institutional Response. Letort Paper. U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA: 
Strategic Studies Institute, April 2011. 
4 Murray, Military Adaptation in War. Prepared for the Director, Net Assessment, Office of the 
Secretary of Defense. Alexandria, Virginia: Institute for Defense Analysis, June 2009: 8-4.  
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theory greater roles in determining the drivers or inputs of change. The subsequent 
process of innovation and its outputs naturally produce a unique strategic culture. In war, 
the opposite is true, as strategic culture instinctively guides decision-making. Nations 
involved in combat usually possess a plethora of resources, but time is limited and 
decisions are confounded by Clausewitzian fog. Those pursuing serious changes in 
doctrine, technology, or tactics have only a brief window of opportunity to adapt. This is 
when strategic culture, or way of war of a particular nation, predominately dictates the 
decision-making processes. This is not to say that elements of realism, bureaucratic 
politics, and organizational theory do not play a role in times of conflict. However, as the 
case studies show, each outcome is predominately explained by strategic culture. In 
effect, the strategic culture of particular military organizations formed during peacetime 
will determine how effectively they will adapt to the actual conditions they will face in 
war. 
This relates to the idea of path dependence, or “that what happened at an earlier 
point in time will affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later 
point in time.”5 This concept of path dependence, in which preceding steps in a particular 
direction induce further movement in the same direction, indicates that once a country 
has developed a unique strategic culture, the costs of reversal are very high, especially 
during wartime. There will be other choice points, but the entrenchments of certain 
institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice, especially after 
encountering technological surprise. As Paul Pierson argues, even if mistakes or failures 
are apparent, improvement through trial-and-error processes is far from automatic. In the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Pierson, Paul. “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics.” The American 
Political Science Review 94, no. 2 (June 2000): 252.  
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context of complex environments, new organizations and policies are costly to create and 
often are complicated by learning effects, coordination effects, and adaptive expectations 
that they generate.6 As such, adaptability and flexibility must be incorporated into 
strategic culture and operational designs.  
While path dependent analyses do not imply that a particular alternative is 
permanent and unchangeable following the move onto a self-reinforcing path, identifying 
self-reinforcing processes helps researches understand why military practices are often 
stubbornly persistent.7 To avoid this outcome, two aspects of a nation’s pre-war strategy 
must be addressed. The first is straightforward; avoid surprise by reforming prewar 
assessments in order to avoid erroneous one-sided predictions. As demonstrated by the 
preceding case studies, the victims of battlefield surprises have enjoyed the unequal 
balance of power, deriving satisfaction from their position of superior strength whether 
quantitatively, qualitatively, or both. As a result they often approach conflicts with 
limited perspective. This leads to the presumption that what is good for the stronger side 
is good for the weaker side. As the Egyptians learned between 1967 and 1973, a superior 
enemy can be beaten on terms other than those he seeks. There are many circumstances 
in which senior leaders fail to understand enemy innovations disregard their relevance to 
the battlefield. In most cases this is due to a decision-making trap; many leaders often 
choose to adhere to comfortable assumptions and time-tested constructs during war, 
failing to realize that the strategic environment in which they function has been 
fundamentally transformed. Rather, the optimal outcome is to exploit the potential for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Ibid, 260.  
7 Ibid, 265.	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innovation by fusing new concepts, technologies, approaches, and organizational 
structures with old, through integration and holistic thinking.  
If the variable of surprise is given as a constant, or an inevitable outcome since 
strategists cannot foresee all enemy actions, the solution to overcoming both learning and 
predictive failures lies in strategic culture and adaptability. A defining characteristic of 
successful militaries, the taxonomy of adaptability includes the following: operational 
flexibility, operational agility, operational resilience, and operational responsiveness. 
 
Future Threat Environment  
According to Barry Watts, the former head of the Defense Department’s Office of 
Program Analysis and Evaluation, the conduct of war is likely to change more 
fundamentally between 2011 and 2050 than it has since the early 1990s.8 If so, then the 
changes in the dominant cultures, operational concepts and doctrines, and organizations 
that the U.S. military services will need to embrace in coming years, will be more 
significant and wrenching than any they have had to make in the early 1990s.  
The next several decades will likely experience a period of even greater 
discontinuous change than the past twenty years in both technology and warfare in the 
form of a military-technical revolution (MTR). Within this MTR, the expansion of the 
guided munitions regime will continue, along with the technological convergence of 
unmanned systems, cyber capabilities, and space systems to produce an entirely new war-
fighting paradigm for the United States, its allies, and its adversaries. More generally, the 
fusion of robotics, global satellite communications networks, advanced sensors, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Barry Watts, “The Maturing Revolution in Military Affairs,” Center for Strategic and 
Budgetary Assessments,  (2011): 14. 
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information technology will continue to create a new mode of data collection, awareness, 
and interaction across the globe that will allow for a new way of combat. The United 
States will be driven to these systems not only out of an operational necessity, but also 
because of their economic practicalities in terms of unit costs and relatively short 
production cycle. Moreover, many of these technologies are dual-use, complicating the 
ability to monitor the spread of militarily significant technologies as well as anticipate 
how they will be employed during a conflict.  
Foreign powers have been quick to recognize the current and future utility of 
emerging systems like robotics. Therefore, in the years to come the United States will not 
be the only beneficiary of this game-changing technology, as it will likely be an area of 
intense competition. The barriers to entry for basic unmanned systems capability are 
already low and will continue to drop, raising the real potential that peer competitors and 
possibly nonstate actors will also field systems in growing numbers. In contemporary and 
future nonlinear operational environments, defense communities must be quick to 
recognize emerging platforms and capabilities in order to seize any first mover 
advantages and understand how systems may be applied to the battlefield. In this rapidly 
changing technology charged environment, the effects of decision-making failure will be 
amplified and ramifications far more severe. 
The challenge for present and future American military leaders is the 
unpredictability of future opponents in major military operations, or the kinds of conflict 
and missions in which they will be involved. It is clear that the unprecedented lethality 
and effectiveness of many modern militaries has deterred opponents from massing on the 
battlefield, driving them to adopt distributed and dispersed operations. In addition, having 
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experienced or observed the cost of conventionally challenging nations like the United 
States directly, would-be adversaries are developing asymmetric approaches to 
circumvent superior power’s core advantages while undermining international support 
and domestic resolve.  
Therefore, future conflicts may range from hybrid contingencies against proxy 
groups using asymmetric approaches, to a high-end conflict against a state power armed 
with weapons of mass destruction or technologically advanced anti-access and area-
denial (A2/AD) capabilities. One such example is the Chinese DF-12D anti-ship ballistic 
missile, or “carrier killer”, the first weapons system capable of targeting a moving aircraft 
carrier strike group from long-range, land-based mobile launchers.9 These adversaries 
pose a significant challenge to the United States’ vital interests at home and abroad. As 
Murray points out:  
Such an international environment obviously carries with it serious 
implications for the U.S. military. It suggests that the threats to American 
interests, as well as those of its allies and partners, will range across the 
spectrum of conflict from peace keeping to peace enforcement to mid-
level conventional conflict, all the way in the best case to deterrence, and 
in the worst case, war at the high end. Thus, the ability to adapt at every 
level of war from the tactical to the strategic and political would seem to 
be more important to the American polity and its military than at any time 
since 1941.10 
 
The enemy is real, and with its own threat assessments and forecasts, it too adapts to the 
conditions it confronts, often in unexpected ways. As war is not static but rather a 
dynamic competition in learning, adaptation demands constant and unceasing change.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2008. A Report to Congress Pursuant to the 
National Defense Authorization Act Fiscal Year 2000. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary 
of Defense: 2.  
10 Ibid, 8-2.  
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Policy Prescriptions  
In a 2008 article on the future of American effects-based operations (EBO), USMC 
General James Mattis outlined several principles involving future theaters of battle, 
underscoring the premium that should be placed on an adaptable fighting force.11 
Prospective enemies are increasingly adaptive and seeking to exploit asymmetries. As 
such, operations in the future will require a balance of regular and irregular competencies 
as dynamic operating environments present an infinite number of variables. All of these 
sources of complexity generate novelty and surprise since it is not scientifically possible 
to accurately predict the outcome of future enemy action. According to Mattis, to suggest 
otherwise runs contrary to historical experience, and the nature of war. In reflecting on 
experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, the General described the error in thinking that what 
works or does not work in one theater is universally applicable to all theaters. He adeptly 
quotes Civil War General William Sherman, “Every attempt to make war easy and safe 
will result in humiliation and disaster.” History is replete with such examples and further 
questions the idea that predictability can strengthen American military doctrine.12 While 
the concept of decision-making traps is not new, future changes will introduce an entirely 
new set of challenges, dramatically altering the way decisions are made on the battlefield. 
In this environment, forces will be required to undertake a wide range of tasks at 
the same time, within the same geographical area, at short notice, and in complex terrain. 
To operate effectively, forces must be adaptable and able to coordinate efforts in a 
precise and discriminating manner. Modular forces manned with highly educated and 
skilled personnel with a capacity for network enabled operations and optimized for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Mattis, Gen. James. “USJFCOM Commander’s Guidance for Effects-Based Operations.” 
Parameters, U.S. Army War College 38, no. 3 (Autumn 2008): 18–25. 
12 Ibid.  
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combat in combined arms teams will be required. These will incorporate traditional 
elements of air, land, and sea combat, as well as non-traditional elements such as civil 
affairs, intelligence, and psychological warfare capabilities with the capacity for 
protracted independent operations within a joint interagency framework over a distributed 
area of operations.13 
To reaffirm Mattis’ main point; war is fundamentally and irreducibly uncertain 
and unpredictable. Efforts to predict and control events in warfare will only mask the true 
complexity of the situation, rather than reducing or eliminating it.14 Therefore, the 
principles of adaptation in mobility, maneuverability, and responsiveness take on even 
greater importance. As military organizations anticipate future conflicts, analyze the 
political-military conditions under which they will occur, and assess the tactics each side 
will pursue, they must encourage a flexible force with a premium on adaptability. This 
sentiment is echoed in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, a legislatively mandated 
review of DoD strategy and priorities that sets a long-term course in strategy and 
capabilities for the defense community:  
Reflecting this diverse range of challenges, the U.S. military will shift 
focus in terms of what kinds of conflicts it prepares for in the future, 
moving toward greater emphasis on the full spectrum of possible 
operations. We will actively seek innovative approaches to how we fight, 
how we posture our force, and how we leverage our asymmetric strengths 
and technological advantages. Innovation is paramount given the 
increasingly complex warfighting environment we expect to encounter.15 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Bassingthwaighte, Australian Army, Maj. Michael. Adaptive Campaigning Applied: Australian 
Army Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military 
Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, May 2011: 11.	  
14 Ryan, Alex. “The Foundation for an Adaptive Approach: Insights from the Science of Complex 
Systems.” Australian Army Journal 6, no. 3. Science of Adaptation (Summer 2009): 73.  
15 Quadrennial Defense Review 2014. Quadrennial Defense Review. Washington, D.C.: 
Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, March 4, 2014: vii.  
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf.  
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The alternative rigid operational design and associated tactics, uniformed by the 
possibility of unforeseen challenges is dangerously misleading. The peril of 
oversimplifying a complex situation is that actions have unintended consequences that 
undermine the best of intentions and efforts.16 Complexity increases the incidence of 
second and third order effects because of interdependence, while simultaneously 
decreasing abilities to predict these effects. Resolving this apparent paradox requires 
acceptance that prediction may have a limited utility for effective interventions in a 
complex adaptive system.17 
The task of twenty-first century strategists, senior officers, and combat 
commanders demands that the inevitable fog and friction of war be approached in the 
context of combat environments, factoring in a vast array of dynamic and increasingly 
complex variables. This requires rigorous, precise thinking and the ability to reconcile a 
wide array of threats, while choosing among a spectrum of responses. However, current 
capabilities-based and effect-based approaches to defense focus on improving existing 
capabilities while assuming that they will suffice to defeat future threats. EBO advocates 
believe that an enemy is a cognitive being that can be dislocated, shocked or disrupted 
into submission or negotiation by a series of offensive actions whose effects and 
outcomes can be calculated by an attacking force.18 This is can lead to an overly inward-
focused effort that may serve to reinforce tactical and strategic norms rather than develop 
a greater culture of flexibility.  
Future War as a Complex Adaptive System 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Ryan, “The Foundation for an Adaptive Approach,” 76. 
17 Ibid, 84.  
18 Kelly, Justin, and David Kilcullen. “Chaos Versus Predictability: A Critique of Effects-Based 
Operations.” Australian Army Journal 2, no. 1. Special Edition: Effects-Based Strategy (Winter 
2004): 87–98. 
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Chaos makes war a complex system, rather than a closed or equilibrium-based system. 
Consequently, combat requires constant adaptation to balance costs with potential 
benefits. As such, strategy, operations, and tactics must be developed through a holistic 
approach to decrease the risks of surprise. This suggests an alternative approach to EBO 
by focusing on the exploitation of the transformative potential of uncertainty and 
surprise, viewing it as an opportunity to disorient the adversary rather than a risk to 
mitigate.  
All approaches to complex situations are based on the notion that adaptation is 
imperative. The U.S. Marine Corps was the first war-fighting organization to realize that 
complex systems science could help describe the complexity of war.19 In 1997, the 
Marine Corps’ primary manual, Warfighting, was updated to incorporate insights from 
complex systems science:  
War is not governed by the actions or decisions of a single individual in 
any one place but emerges from the collective behavior of all the 
individual parts in the system interacting locally in response to local 
conditions and incomplete information. A military action is not the 
monolithic execution of a single decision by a single entity but necessarily 
involves near-countless independent but interrelated decisions and actions 
being taken simultaneously throughout the organization. Efforts to fully 
centralize military operations and to exert complete control by a single 
decision maker are inconsistent with the intrinsically complex and 
distributed nature of war.20 
 
The science dictates that as complex problems have no central point of control, the 
execution of simultaneous lines of operation, as opposed to linear action, is the key to 
affecting lasting desired change on a system. In applying complex science to military 
science, “Linear metaphors, such a center of gravity, are still useful, however, care needs 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Ibid, 73. 
20 United States Marine Corps. “Warfighting.” Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1997. 
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to be taken in their utilization to ensure that they do not become the sole foundation of a 
planning process or operational framework.”21 
As the USMC first demonstrated, operational art increasingly requires balancing 
design and planning while remaining open to learning and adapting quickly to change. 
Effective learning and adaptation, while campaigning or “adaptive campaigning,” is a 
key part of this evolving approach to military operations. Adaptive campaigning 
represents the art of assessing dynamic situations and developing designs, plans, modes 
of learning, and actions to keep pace. “Campaigning” refers to extended operations 
requiring balanced design and planning.22 Adaptive campaigning draws on complex 
systems science, particularly the theory of complex adaptive systems, which is different 
from other systems in the large numbers of internal mechanisms that are loosely but not 
sparsely connected. These flexible internal parts enable the system to survive as it adapts 
to unpredicted circumstances.23 However, while variations in existing conditions result in 
minor adaptations to the overall system, it is not possible to forecast these outcomes in 
advance. Predictability in complex adaptive systems is limited to the qualitative emergent 
patterns rather than chaotic local details; specific causes cannot be linked to particular 
effects.24 
A military does not simply pursue adaptive operations, but rather, must fully 
integrate it within its strategic culture. For example, the Australian Army recently 
adopted the Adaptive Army Initiative, a formal doctrinal framework involving the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Bassingthwaighte, Adaptive Campaigning Applied, 28.  
22 Wass de Czege, Brig. Gen. Huba. “Systemic Operational Design: Learning and Adapting in 
Complex Missions.” Military Review. Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KA (February 
2009): 2–12. 
23 Bassingthwaighte, Adaptive Campaigning Applied, 17.  
24 Rihani, Samir. Complex Systems Theory and Development Practice: Understanding Non-
Linear Realities. London; New York: Zed Books, 2002: 80-105.  
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identification of a four-step adaptation cycle: act, sense, decide, adapt.25 The first step, 
action, emphasizes that adaptation is proactive rather than reactive, and assumes that 
action will always occur in the face of uncertainty, and the emergence of novelty. Action 
stimulates the system to generate a response (such as forcing the adversary to unmask 
from below the discrimination threshold). The response serves as the basis for subsequent 
decisions. The final step, adapt, emphasizes that every action is a learning opportunity.26  
Adaptive campaigning does not function independent of strategic planning, but 
rather complements operations by imbedding absorptive capabilities within strategic 
culture to ensure flexibility and proper feedback loops. Feedback is essential; it assumes 
even great importance in non-linear environments in order to maximize positive feedback 
and counteract negative feedback. As such, the adaptation cycle involves the flow of 
information through networks of both positive and negative feedback in order to inform 
operational planning and emphasize adaptations as needed.   
 
Conclusion 
The basis of adaptive campaigning is to encourage national security establishments to 
increasingly become learning institutions, defined as an organization that uses new 
knowledge or understanding gained from experience or study to adjust institutional 
norms, doctrine, and procedures in ways designed to minimize previous gaps in 
performance and maximize future successes.27 Organizational learning is a complex cycle 
involving several interconnected processes. Organizations that fail to learn are often 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Ibid, 23.  
26 Ryan, “The Foundation for an Adaptive Approach,” 84.   
27 Russell, James A. Innovation, Transformation, and War: Counterinsurgency Operations in 
Anbar and Ninewa, Iraq, 2005-2007. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Security Studies, 2011: 42.  
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stymied by factors such as cognitive beliefs by powerful leaders, organizational incentive 
structures that discourage creativity, or structural processes that block the transmission of 
knowledge.28 These factors reflect themes in organizational theory and bureaucratic 
politics, on which much military innovation literature is based. While individual learning 
is necessary, it alone is not sufficient for organizational learning to occur. Organizations 
must possess a culture conducive to adaptation.  
In the pursuit of adaptability, leaders must foster a culture that tolerates dissent. 
“The most critical variable for reform... may be its ability to tolerate dissent and balance 
such dissent with the ever-present requirement for discipline and obedience, which is the 
sine qua non of effective combat performance.”29  If the organization approaches dissent 
and debate on fundamental issues in a thoughtful and consistent way, then individuals 
will be more apt to think and act in innovative ways, especially when encountering 
unforeseen battlefield scenarios. 
An individual’s ability to learn effectively, adapt rapidly and appropriately, and to 
solve problems has always been valuable to commanders. Yet unlike bureaucratic politics 
theory, a command’s collective quality of design, learning, and adaptation is what 
determines results. Military leaders may value individual creativity, critical thinking, 
continuous learning, and adaptability in their staff and subordinate commanders, but 
individual traits do not necessarily equate with the collective abilities needed for the best 
outcomes. 
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Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2010: 26.  
29 Winton, Harold R. The Challenge of Change: Military Institutions and New Realities, 1918-
1941. Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 2000: xiv.  
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As demonstrated, winning wars often requires undergoing changes to a fighting 
force, whether through technological acquisitions, new tactics, or redefined operational 
concepts. The change requires an understanding of the bottom up, self-organizing sources 
of order and stability in addition to the top down, formal mechanisms for imposing order. 
Through a combination of theory, practice, and reflection, a fighting force can improve 
learning within a complex situation through strategic culture, thereby enhancing its 
adaptive capacity and by extension its survivability on future battlefields.  
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